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INTRODUCTION
Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code),
a secured party may repossess collateral from a defaulting debtor.'
Following the repossession, the secured party may sell the collateral
at a foreclosure sale.2 The purchaser of the collateral generally
obtains all rights of the debtor through the foreclosure sale.3 The
secured party's right to sell the collateral, however, is conditioned on
the debtor actually being in default.4  Under the Code, the
purchaser's rights against the debtor and third parties are also
contingent on the debtor being in default.5 The Code does not,
1. U.C.C. §§ 9-501, -503. In this Article, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code
are to the 1987 Official Text.
2. Id. § 9-504.
3. Section 9-504(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition transfers
to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security
interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto.
The purchaser takes free of all such rights and interest even though the secured party
fails to comply with the requirements of this Part or any judicial proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in
the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or
the person conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
Id. § 9-504(4).
4. Id. §§ 9-501, -504(1); see 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 43.3, at 1190-91 (1965) (stating that secured party cannot take action on debt or move against
security until event of default has occurred); see also Martens v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 729 F.
Supp. 1391, 1396 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that default is prerequisite to secured party's right to
repossess and sell collateral); Wynn v. Adams County Bank, 761 P.2d 234, 236 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988) (stating that creditor entitled to repossess inventory on debtor's default); Borochoff
Properties v. Howard Lumber Co., 155 S.E.2d 651, 655 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (explaining that
secured party could sell collateral after debtor's bankruptcy, which constituted default under
contract between parties); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 47 (Okla. 1984)
(holding creditor liable for conversion after repossessing where debtor was not in default);
Trimble v. Sonitrol of Memphis, 723 S.W.2d 633, 643 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
pledgee, under pledge, only acquires special property right to sell collateral after default);
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. McCoy, 270 S.E.2d 164, 166 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that secured
party may repossess and sell, lease, or othenise dispose of collateral on default); WILLIAM D.
HAWNVLAND, HAWiLAND UCC SERIES § 9-501:05, at 708-11 (1982) (explaining that secured party
has right to enforce security interest by anyjudicial procedure); Cynthia Starnes, U.C.C. Section
9-504 Sales by Junior Secured Parties: Is a Senior Party Entitled to Notice and Proceeds?, 52 U. Pirr. L.
REV. 563, 581 (1991) (suggesting that default of debtor is necessary prerequisite to secured
party's exercising right to foreclose and sell collateral). But seeWatson v. Branch County Bank,
380 F. Supp. 945, 976 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (holding that alleged default, in discretion of secured
party, is sufficient to trigger right to repossess under article 9), rev'd without opinion, 516 F.2d 902
(6th Cir. 1975).
5. U.C.C. § 9-504(4). Section 9-504(4) applies only to a disposition of the collateral after
default. It provides, "When the collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein . ... " Id.
(emphasis added); see also Lichty v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 467 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Neb.
1991) (stating that good faith purchaser of collateral property takes collateral property free of
claims of defaulting debtor); 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 42.14, at 1175-80 (explaining that
secured party's sale of collateral is wrongful when done without default).
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however, clearly address the rights of the debtor and purchaser in the
event that the secured party wrongfully declares the debtor in default
and subsequently repossesses and sells the collateral. This Article
addresses those rights under both the Code and the common law. It
suggests that the drafters of the Code created an unintended paradox
whereby the purchaser loses the battle over the collateral with the
non-defaulting debtor, but is not given a right under the Code to
recover damages from the selling secured creditor.6 For protection,
the purchaser must resort to whatever rights may be available at
common law or in equity.7 These rights, however, may be inadequate
or unattractive.' This Article therefore suggests amendments to
article 9 of the Code to correct this inequity and uncertainty, and to
clarify the rights of the parties.
I. THE PROBLEM
The problem is best illustrated by the following hypothetical
situation:
Debtor, a collector of vintage automobiles, purchases an
authentic 1948 Tucker to add to her collection. Debtor finances
the sale through Bank, which attaches an enforceable security
interest in the Tucker to secure repayment of the loan. The
security agreement requires that Debtor maintain adequate
insurance on the Tucker, with a minimum policy value equal to the
amount of the debt owing to Bank. Debtor complies, and the
insurance broker promptly mails proof of insurance to Bank. Bank
receives the document, but misfiles it, due to a clerical error.
On a routine review of the file, a bank officer determines that
Debtor has not complied with the agreement's insurance require-
ment and declares Debtor to be in default. Unable to reach Debtor
for clarification,9 Bank repossesses the automobile and sells it at an
6. SeeU.C.C. § 2-312(2); id. § 2-312 cmt. 5. If the collateral is a good, the warranty of title
under article 2 generally will not attach if it is purchased at a foreclosure sale. Id.; see also
discussion infra Part IV.A (explaining general rule that no warranty of title attaches in
foreclosure sale).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See Menachem Mautner, The Eternal Triangles of the Law: Toward a Theory of Priorities in
Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REv. 95, 96 (1991) (arguing that legal remedies
currently available to party in tort or contract are inadequate to redress aggrieved party). Where
the collateral is unique or the wrongdoer is the original secured creditor and is judgment proof,
a cause of action against the secured party will be inadequate. Id. Furthermore, the common
law right of restitution, the potential remedy, is generally limited to the return of the purchase
price, thereby depriving the purchaser of the benefit of his bargain. See infra note 144 and
accompanying text.
9. The Author recognizes that this is an oversimplification of how the transaction would
typically transpire in a commercial setting. Generally the creditor will make attempts to contact
the debtor to determine whether insurance has been obtained. The creditor may also obtain
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otherwise commercially reasonable sale to Purchaser.' Debtor's
attorney advises her that she may recover monetary damages from
Bank for the wrongful repossession." Due to the uniqueness of
the automobile, Debtor instead seeks to reclaim the vehicle from
Purchaser, but Purchaser refuses to relinquish it.
To determine the respective rights and the potential liabilities of
the involved parties, two issues must be addressed: (1) whether
Debtor can successfully reclaim the automobile from Purchaser and,
if so; (2) whether Purchaser can, in turn, successfully recover damages
from Bank for losses caused by Bank's failure to convey good title to
him. Because Debtor was not in default under the agreement, having
purchased the insurance, 12 Bank had no right under the Code to
insurance directly on the collateral and add the premium cost to the debt, an action generally
permitted under a standard security agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-207(2) (a) (permitting secured
party in possession of collateral to obtain insurance and add premium cost to debt). This
heuristic example, however, raises the issues necessary for purposes of this discussion.
10. Other scenarios may arise where the secured party declares a default, though none
exists under the hypothetical parties' agreement. Acceleration of the debt and subsequent
declaration of default, under an insecurity clause, in bad faith and in violation ofU.C.C. § 1-208
is one such situation. See Brown v. Avemco Inv. Co., 603 F.2d 1367, 1380 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that acceleration of debt by secured creditor acting in bad faith vitiates debtor's
default); Farmer & Merchants Bank of Centre v. Hancock, 506 So. 2d 305, 316 (Ala. 1987)
(holding that acceleration of note without reasonable basis for insecurity was unjustified and
repossession without debtor's default was thus wrongful); ef. In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, 87
B.R. 752, 768 (Bankr. Mass. 1988) (ordering that lender be estopped from claiming default
where lender approved substitution of collateral of lesser value for original collateral); Friendly
Credit Union v. Campbell, 579 So. 2d 1288, 1291 (Ala. 1991) (deciding that debtor was not in
default); Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 168 S.E.2d 827, 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that
death of debtor was not default); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau, 295 N.W.2d 232, 238
(Minn. 1980) (holding that creditor's repeated acceptance of late payments prevented
declaration of default and repossession); Lincoln v. Grinstead, 379 S.E.2d 671, 674 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (deciding that debtor's failure to make payments to seller due to breach of warranty
was not default); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 47 (Okla. 1984) (holding that
debtor's sale of collateral was not default where account was not in default and creditor
approved of sale).
11. See U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (providing debtor with right to recover damages for "any loss
caused by [a secured party's] failure to comply with the provisions of" part 5 of U.C.C. article
9); see also infra note 14 (explaining that U.C.C. § 9-507(1) gives debtor right to recover damages
from secured party who does not comply with default provisions).
12. Generally, the terms of default are found in the security agreement between the parties.
See Starnes, supra note 4, at 564 (arguing that, because article 9 does not define default, default
is essentially whatever parties say it is). Article 9 does not define default. See First Nat'l Bank
v. Beug, 400 N.W.2d 893, 898 (S.D. 1987) (recognizing that default was sufficiently defined by
parties' agreement); 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 43.3, at 1193 (stating that, beyond general
requirement of timely payment, default is, within reason, matter of contract, and can best be
defined as whatever security agreement says it is); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-2, at 1189 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that apart from modest
limitations imposed by doctrine of unconscionability and requirement of good faith, default is
whatever security agreement says it is); William E. Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2 UCC LJ.
244, 244 (1970) (recognizing that definition of default is not provided in Code, but is matter
defined by particular agreement). Default commonly occurs when the debtor fails to perform
or comply with a provision of the security agreement between the parties. Manufacturers
Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Ace Drilling Co., 726 F. Supp. 966, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that
because U.C.C. does not define default, parties' definition governs); United States v. Pirnie, 339
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repossess or sell the vehicle." The Code clearly gives Debtor a cause
of action against Bank for damages she sustained as a direct result of
the wrongful repossession. 4 With unique collateral,15 however,
F. Supp. 702, 712 (D. Neb. 1972) (holding that debtor's failure to properly care for collateral,
in violation of agreement, constitutes default); Whisenhunt 168 S.E.2d at 832 (holding that, while
death may be included as basis for default, it is not automatically included, and that, absent
specific inclusion in agreement, default occurs only when debtor fails to meet his obligation to
make payments on debt); Borochoff Properties v. Howard Lumber Co., 155 S.E.2d 651,655 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1967) (upholding security agreement that made bankruptcy event of default).
13. There are two specific sections of the U.C.C. that condition the right to repossess
collateral upon the debtor's default. U.C.C. § 9-501 ("When a debtor is in default under a
security agreement, a secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this Part [Five] .
.. "); id. § 9-503 ("Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral."). Further, § 9-504(1) conditions the right to resell the collateral
upon the debtor's default. Id. § 9-504(1); see also supra note 4 (providing instances in which
necessity of actual default has been upheld). The secured creditor's sale of the collateral before
the debtor is in default would also violate U.C.C. § 9-207, which delineates the responsibilities
of a creditor in possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-207. The creditor may not impair the
debtor's right to redeem the collateral. Id. § 9-207(2) (e). While a repledge of the collateral is
permitted so long as the debtor's right to redeem is not impaired, a sale of the collateral would
impair this right, and thus violate the creditor's duties under § 9-207.
14. U.C.C. § 9-507(1). Section 9-507(1) gives the debtor a right to recover damages from
a secured party who does not comply with part 5 (Default provisions) of article 9. Id. Because
Debtor was not in default, the bank wrongfully availed itself of the remedies for default provided
in part 5. Therefore, Debtor is entitled to monetary damages under U.C.C. § 9-507(1) and the
common law. See Martin Specialty Vehicles, 87 B.R. at 768 (holding that secured creditor was liable
for damages for wrongful foreclosure where debtor was not in default under security
agreement); see also Georgia Cent. Credit Union v. Coleman, 271 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980) (ruling that debtor had right to recoverfrom creditor any losses suffered due to creditor's
failure to comply with commercial code); Kouba v. EastJoliet Bank, 481 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1985) (indicating that debtor who specifically pleads statutory remedy could be entitled
to statutory damages for wrongful repossession); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329
N.E.2d 620, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that debtor is entitled to damages for conversion
if debtor proves that secured creditor accelerated debt in bad faith); Joyce v. Cloverbrook
Homes, 344 S.E.2d 58, 60-61 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that party under repurchase
agreement had duties of secured creditor and was liable to debtor for money damages under
§ 9-507(1) for failure to give debtors notice of sale as required by U.C.C.); Peoples Acceptance
Corp. v. Van Epps, 395 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (ruling that debtor is entitled to
damages where creditor failed to sell collateral in commercially reasonable manner, in violation
of U.C.C.); First City Bank v. Guex, 677 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex. 1984) (holding that debtor was
entitled to money damages for creditor's failure to comply with article 9); Stone Machinery Co.
v. Kessler, 463 P.2d 651, 656 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (finding that debtor was entitled to
compensatory damages for secured creditor's wrongful repossession); WALTER RAUSHENBUSH,
BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 15.11, at 507 (1975) (stating that secured party who converts
collateral to his possession is liable for money damages under § 9-507(1), and for tort of conver-
sion). The debtor may also have a defense to the creditor's action for a deficiency judgment.
See Hoch v. Ellis, 627 P.2d 1060, 1065-66 (Alaska 1981) (stating that, where sale of repossessed
collateral violated provision of U.C.C., secured creditor had burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that sale was at fair market value); Topeka Datsun Motor Co. v. Stratton,
736 P.2d 82, 92 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (ordering consumer debtor relieved of liability for
deficiencyjudgment where creditor violated U.C.C. in disposition of collateral); Maryland Nat'l
Bank v. Wathen, 414 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Md. 1980) (holding that secured party who fails to give
notice of sale to one of multiple debtors is barred from recovering deficiencyjudgment); Bank
of Burwell v. Kelley, 445 N.W.2d 871, 879 (Neb. 1989) (stating that compliance with notice
provisions of U.C.C. is condition precedent to secured creditor's recovery of deficiency
judgment); Whirlybirds Leasing Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 749 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that creditor who violated U.C.C. was barred from deficiency
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money damages may be insufficient. 6 Debtor may therefore wish to
reclaim the property that she rightfully owns and that was wrongfully
taken from her. A careful reading of the Code and the relevant case
law is required to determine the rights, under current law, of Debtor
and Purchaser in the disputed collateral.
II. RIGHTS OF PURCHASER OF REPOSSESSED COLLATERAL IN THE
ABSENCE OF DEFAULT
To determine whether Debtor may reclaim her good from
Purchaser, the rights that Purchaser acquired through the sale must
be ascertained. If, through the foreclosure sale, the purchaser
received good title, defensible against the debtor, the purchaser would
judgment). But see In re Excello Press, 890 F.2d 896, 907 (7th Cir. 1989) (deciding that secured
creditor's failure to comply with default provisions of article 9 merely raises rebuttable
presumption that fair market value of collateral at proper sale would have occurred at amount
equal to debt); Barbour v. United States, 562 F.2d 19, 22 (10th Cir. 1977) (stating that debtor's
damages under U.C.C. § 9-507(1) are merely set-off against secured creditor's deficiency
judgment); Tennant Co. v. Martin's Landscaping, 515 A.2d 665, 669 (Conn. Super. CL 1986)
(holding that, where creditor sells repossessed collateral without giving required statutory notice,
rebuttable presumption arises that proper sale would have been at amount equal to outstanding
debt); Westgate State Bank v. Clark, 642 P.2d 961, 972 (Kan. 1982) (holding that, in non-
consumer commercial transaction, secured party's failure to comply with provisions of U.C.C.
is not absolute bar to deficiencyjudgment); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, 521 P.2d 1191,
1197 (Wash. Ct App. 1974) (holding that only penalty for secured creditor's failure to comply
with statutory requirements is debtor's right to recover damages under U.C.C. § 9-507(1)). For
an overview of the various approaches to this remedy, see CHRISTINE A. FERRIS & BENNETT H.
GOLDSTEIN, DISPOSITION OF REPOSSESSED COLIATERAL UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 9.1 to 9.5 (1990) (explaining absolute bar rule, rebuttable presumption rule, and set-off rule
as competing judicial approaches to noncompliance with code requirements) and Kathryn P.
Seebart, A Secured Party's Right to a Deficiency Judgment After Noncompliance with the Resale Provisions
of Article 9, 60 N.D. L. REv. 531, 534-36 (1984) (explaining that courts have advanced three
methods to solve problem of second party's noncompliance with § 9-504: absolute bar
approach, set-off approach, and shift approach).
15. This may also be true where the collateral is equipment that is essential to the debtor's
business and difficult to replace. SeeMartin Specialty Vehicles, 87 B.R. at 768 (discussing lost profit
damages for secured creditor's bad faith foreclosure on debtor's property that caused loss of
corporate debtor's entire business).
16. Ajudgment for money damages entered against the selling secured creditor would be
unsatisfactory where the secured creditor is insolvent orjudgment proof, a situation that is not
uncommon in today's business environment. For a sampling of the many authorities dealing
with the various aspects of the savings and loan debacle, see Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2, 5, 12, 15, 26, 28, 31, 40, 42, and 44 U.S.C.); Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901,921 (D.D.C. 1990) (upholding imposition of receivership on Lincoln
Savings & Loan); Carol R. Goforth, Criticizing the Financial Institution Insurance Agencies' "Super-
Powers," 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 198 (1990) (discussing benefits and advantages of spccial rights
and privileges granted to FDIC in dealing with insolvency of financial institution); Bonfire of the
S&Ls, NEWSWEEK, May 21, 1990, at 20 (arguing that burden of $250 billion savings and loan
debacle will ultimately be borne by taxpayers in form of higher taxes and program cutting); The
Unending Deposit Insurance Mess, SCIENCE, Oct. 27, 1989, at 451 (arguing that politicians and
regulators must surrender discretion that permits them to evade issue of need to budget for
governmental financial commitments).
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be entitled to retain the collateral.'7  If the purchaser did not
acquire good title to the property through the transfer by the
creditor, the debtor may be able to defeat the purchaser's interest
and reclaim the good.'
A. Purchaser's Rights Under Article 9
Article 9 of the Code permits the transfer of the debtor's rights in
the collateral to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale only when the
debtor is in default.19 The right of the secured creditor to enforce
his security interest by availing himself of the remedies provided
under the Code, including repossession and resale, is limited to
instances "[w]hen a debtor is in default under a security agree-
ment."2  Article 9 also recognizes that the secured party "after
default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the collateral."" A
secured party who has repossessed and sold collateral when the
debtor is not in default, however, has converted the debtor's
property22 because the creditor's actions are unauthorized by the Code.
23
17. Brandywine Lanes v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 264 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa. 1970) (holding that,
where secured creditor has obtained valid judgment for repossession of collateral, assignee of
judgment may enforce judgment and interest in collateral against debtor).
18. Centennial State Bank v. S.C.K. Constr. Co., 518 S.W.2d 143, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that assignee has no greater rights than assignor); see also infra note 20 and
accompanying text (stating that § 9-503 gives secured party right to repossess collateral on
default).
19. U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
20. Id. § 9-501(1); see also id. § 9-503 (giving secured party right to repossess collateral "on
default" unless parties agree); id. (stating that right "accrues on default"); see also American
Furniture Co. v. Extebank, 676 F. Supp. 455, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that secured party is
entitled to sell collateral so long as default exists); Central & S. Bank v. Williford, 386 S.E.2d 688,
690 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that secured creditor acquired right to repossess upon
default); Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Ass'n, 261 N.W.2d 127, 132-33
(Wis. 1978) (explaining that secured creditor has no right to repossess in absence of default);
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and American Institute, Unfform
Commercial Code: Proceedings in Committee of the Whole (Sept. 2-3, 1949), reprinted in THE KARL
LLEELLYN PAPERs 64 [hereinafter Proceedings 1949] (comments of Professor Allison Dunham,
a principal drafter of U.C.C.) (stating that no right to repossess or sell exists in absence of
default).
21. U.C.C. § 9-504(1); see also DeVita Fruit Co. v. FCA Leasing Corp., 473 F.2d 585,589 (6th
Cir. 1973) (holding that secured party has right under U.C.C. to resell goods on debtor's
default).
22. RSSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965) ("Conversion is an intentional
exercise of dominion or control over a chattel, which so seriously interferes with the right of
another to control it that the actor mayjustly be required to pay the other the full value of the
chattel.").
23. See Brown v. Avemco Inv. Co., 603 F.2d 1367, 1380 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that debtor
is entitled to recover for conversion where creditor repossesses after accelerating debt in bad
faith); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that, where creditor accelerated debt in bad faith, repossession was act of conversion);
Farmers State Bank v. Haflich, 699 P.2d 553, 559 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that, where
debtor is entitled to notice of right to cure, failure to send such notice vitiates debtor's default,
and repossession thereafter amounts to conversion); Lincoln v. Grinstead, 379 S.E.2d 671, 674
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Because the sale of the collateral by the secured party is not
permitted under the Code when the debtor is not in default, the
rights of the purchaser are unclear. Section 9-504(4) gives the
purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights in the collateral "when
the collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default." 4
Virtually every case that has addressed the purchaser's rights in the
collateral under section 9-504 indicates that the rights arise through
a sale conducted after default.' No court, however, has specifically
applied section 9-504 to address the issue presented by the hypotheti-
cal: whether a good faith purchaser for value obtains rights in the
collateral superior to the debtor when the debtor was not in default
at the time of repossession and sale.
One court has addressed a similar issue in the context of a sale
conducted after entry of judgment and issuance of a writ of attach-
ment. In Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi,2 6 Inmi-Etti, the owner of a motor vehicle,
sued a car dealership, Pohanka, for conversion.27 The car dealer
had purchased the vehicle from Butler, who had obtained a default
judgment against Inmi-Etti.2" Thejudgment under which Butler had
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that wrongful repossession constitutes conversion); Mitchell v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 47 (Okla. 1984) (holding that creditor is liable for
conversion for repossession where debtor is not in default); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12,
§ 25-17, at 1240; infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text (discussing effect of wrongful
repossession on secured creditor); see also Pleasant v. Warrick, 590 So. 2d 214, 217 (Ala. 1991)
(holding that repossession is lawful where debtor is in default); First Nat'l Bank v. Lachenmyer,
476 N.E.2d 755, 765 (I1. App. Ct. 1985) (deciding that debtor in default under security
agreement is not entitled to recover for conversion).
24. U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
25. See Personal Jet v. Callihan, 624 F.2d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
commercially reasonable sale of collateral by secured party afler default f debtor transfers good
title to purchaser); West Chicago State Bank v. Rogers, 515 N.E.2d 1261, 1271 (Il. App. Ct.
1987) (holding that sale after default transfers all of debtor's rights to purchaser); Lichty v.
Federal Land Bank, 467 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Neb. 1991) (stating that good faith purchaser of
collateral at private sale acquires rights of defaulting debtor); see also Davis v. Huntsville Prod.
Credit Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Ala. 1985) (stating that creditor has no right to credit
proceeds from foreclosure sale to second debt where debtor is not in default on that debt);
Production Credit, 261 N.W.2d at 132-33 (holding that secured creditor has no right to possession
of collateral in absence of default by debtor). But see Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F.
Supp. 945, 954 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (stating, in dicta, that purchaser at foreclosure sale may take
collateral free of debtor's security interest and all subordinate liens or security interests upon
"alleged" default), rev'd without opinion, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975). The commentators also
assume that the purchaser's rights against the debtor exist as a result of a sale after default. See
generally HAWKLAND, supra note 4, § 9-504:11 (explaining that purchaser receives collateral free
from rights of debtor and holders of subordinate security interests and liens); Starnes, supra note
4, at 564-67, 575-76 (suggesting that foreclosure rights of secured party under article 9, including
right to resell, are conditioned on debtor's default); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-2,
at 1189-91 (stating that default is whatever parties say it is and condition precedent to rights of
parties under Part IV of article 9).
26. 492 A.2d 917 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
27. Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 920 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
28. Id.
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attached and sold the vehicle was ultimately set aside. 9 The sale to
Pohanka, however, had already been consummated."0 The court
held that Butler had no right to possess or sell the vehicle because the
default judgment under which it was sold was invalid.31 Because
Butler had no rights in the vehicle, he could transfer no rights to
Pohanka.32 Accordingly, even though Pohanka had no knowledge
of defects in either the underlying judgment or the certificate of title
that it received from Butler, Pohanka was guilty of conversion and
liable to the true owner for damages.3
In another analogous case, Fitzpatrick v. Bank of New York, 4 a good
faith purchaser for value obtained title to an automobile sold
pursuant to a court judgment.35 The original owner, however, had
granted a security interest in the automobile to the defendant, Bank
of New York, 36 and the security interest was properly noted on the
original certificate of title.
The original owner had accumulated a significant number of
parking tickets that resulted in ajudgment in favor of the City of New
York and the impoundment of the vehicle by the City Marshal.38
Pursuant to the judgment, the car was then sold at public auction. 9
After the sale, a new certificate of title was issued to the purchaser by
the Department of Motor Vehicles, which negligently dropped Bank
of New York's lien from the title.4" The plaintiff, Fitzpatrick, in turn
purchased the vehicle from the auction purchaser without knowledge
or notice of the bank's security interest.41 The court held that
Fitzpatrick, who was concededly a good faith purchaser for value
without knowledge or notice of the bank's interest,42 took title to the
automobile subject to the security interest. 3 Although Fitzpatrick's
seller had purchased the vehicle at a public auction conducted
29. Id. at 919.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 923. The suit through which Butler obtained a defaultjudgment against Inmi-Etti
was completely without merit. Id. at 918.
32. Id. at 923.
33. Id. at 924.
34. 480 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
35. Fitzpatrick v. Bank of N.Y., 480 N.Y.S.2d 864, 864 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 865 (explaining that original lien was "recorded and perfected by defendant..




41. Id. (explaining that plaintiff received unencumbered certificate of title from
Department of Motor Vehicles).
42. Id. at 868.
43. Id.
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pursuant to a valid judgment and had received a "clean" certificate of
title through the sale, the court reasoned that the seller took subject
to the bank's interest, which was superior to that of the repossessing
judgment creditor, the City of New York.' The court therefore
concluded that Fitzpatrick could take no greater interest than his
transferor had.45 Because the original purchaser took subject to the
security interest, so then did Fitzpatrick.46
Although Inmi-Etti and Fitzpatrick were not decided under section 9-
504(4), their principles are instructive. In Inmi-Etti, a good faith
purchaser obtained no title to the good, even though the vehicle was
sold under a facially valid judgment and attachment.4 7 In Fitzpatrick,
a good faith purchaser without notice of a superior interest did not
obtain good and clear title to a good sold at public auction pursuant
to a valid judgment.4 These holdings are consistent with other cases
that have considered the rights of purchasers atjudicial or foreclosure
sales.4 9 Generally, sales approved by a court or conducted pursuant
to a court decree are given greater deference than foreclosure sales
conducted by private parties without court intervention.50 If a good
44. Id. The court relied on (1) U.C.C. § 9-306(2), which provides that a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding a sale unless the creditor authorizes the sale or the Code
otherwise provides, and (2) U.C.C. § 9-307, which governs when a buyer of a good can take free
of a perfected security interest. Id. at 865-66, 868.
45. Id. at 868 (relying on U.C.C. § 9-306(2)); see also U.C.C. § 2-403(1) ("A purchaser of
goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer.").
46. See Fitzpatrick, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 868; see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text
(explaining that security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale unless sale was
authorized by secured party).
47. Inmi-Ett4 492 A.2d at 919 (noting that no judicial sale was conducted, and suggesting
that outcome may have been different had there been proper judicial sale).
48. Fitzpatrick, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 869. Although Fitzpatrick was legally the owner of the
vehicle, the court recognized that he had no actual interest in the car because the amount owed
under bank's security interest exceeded the vehicle's value. Id. Furthermore, the warranty of
title under article 2 of the U.C.C. is breached when a good is transferred subject to a security
interest about which the buyer does not know. U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (b).
49. See, e.g., Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Continental Kitchens, 501 P.2d 639, 642 (Nev.
1972) (applying U.C.C. principles to third-party bank's security interest); GMAC v. Stotsky, 303
N.Y.S.2d 463, 467 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that purchaser at sheriffs sale receives oxnly rights
and title to good that sheriffis able to convey); Paccar Fin. Corp. v. HarnettTransfer, 275 S.E.2d
243, 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that purchaser for value at foreclosure sale conducted
to satisfy mechanic's lien took subject to superior interest of secured creditor).
50. SeeU.C.C. § 9-507(2) (permitting challenges to procedures and commercial reasonable-
ness of sales conducted without judicial approval, while providing that dispositions that have
been approved by judicial proceeding are "conclusively deemed to be commercially
reasonable"); see also Hayes v. Sullivan, Civ. A. 92-12020-K, 1992 WL 486914, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec.
3, 1992) ("[T]he sale is approved by the court and entitled to the deference accorded a
judicially confirmed sale."); Steichen v. First Bank Grand, 372 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (stating that strict adherence to law of self-help repossession is necessary to prevent abuse
and to discourage illegal conduct due to harshness of remedy); Davis v. Wood, 268 P.2d 371,377
(Or. 1954) (commenting that, under pre-Code law, forfeitures of debtor's property were
generally regarded with judicial hostility).
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faith purchaser for value from a judgment creditor does not obtain
rights in the purchased good superior to the original owner, where
the underlying judgment is invalid, then a purchaser from a secured
creditor who has wrongfully resorted to the self-help remedies of
repossession and resale should obtain no greater rights under the
Code. Similarly, if a good faith purchaser for value at a judicial sale
takes subject to a superior security interest, such a purchaser at a
foreclosure sale should be subordinate to the interest of the good's
owner. Inmi-Etti and Fitzpatrick suggest, at the least, that a non-
defaulting debtor may have a cause of action against a purchaser of
repossessed collateral where the debtor was entitled to possession of
the good.5'
Part 5 of article 952 and the Official Comments thereto53 support
this result. Their language demonstrates that the Code's drafters
intended that default be the trigger of the secured party's rights and
powers that are recognized in part 5.54 The Code's history and the
purposes of the language of section 9-504 also support this conclu-
sion.
Subsection four of section 9-504 was drafted to insulate purchasers
at foreclosure sales from the complaints of defaulted debtors over
irregularities in the conduct of the sale.55 Without some provision
51. When a debtor is not in default, the debtor is entitled to possession of the collateral
unless the parties have otherwise agreed. See Mevorah v. Goodman, 65 N.W.2d 278, 285 (N.D.
1954) (deciding rights of conditional vendee under pre-Code law); see also U.C.C. § 9-503
("Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the
collateral.") (emphasis added).
52. See U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507 (setting forth rights and remedies of debtor and secured
party after default).
53. See id. §§ 9-501 to -507 cmts.
54. See generally id. § 9-501(1), (6) cmts. (distinguishing scenario under which secured
creditor is protected independent of default, implying that drafters intended that, generally,
default is prerequisite to secured creditor's remedies). This conclusion is further supported by
the commentators and case law. See genera!yJefferds v. Ellis, 486 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651 (Sup. Ct.
1985) (quoting U.C.C. § 9-503 that "'unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default the
right to take possession of the collateral'"); 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1248 (explaining
that purchaser of collateral has greater degree of protection in wrongful post-default transfers);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, §§ 25-1 to -5, at 1187-99 (discussing default as condition prece-
dent to secured party's right to repossess and resell collateral); Starnes, supra note 4, at 564
(defining term "default" as contemplated by U.C.C.); supra notes 14, 23 (citing numerous cases
in which creditors were held liable for conversion when property was transferred prior to
debtors' default).
55. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1248; see also Proceedings 1949, supra note 20, at 71,
wherein Professor Dunham discussed the purposes of the preliminary draft of U.C.C. § 9-504(4)
(then § 8-604(3)), stating.
Subsection 3 [currently (4)] protects the validity of the sale as far as the purchaser at
the sale is concerned, no matter how much the secured lender disregards the section.
In other words, if the secured lender fails to sell as this section requires, the borrower's
remedy is to look to the secured lender and not to the bona fide purchaser for value
at the sale. So, in a sense, subsection (3) rejects the line of decisions that say that a
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to protect them, prospective purchasers might avoid buying at foreclo-
sure sales. Without some guarantee that defensible title will be
conveyed at least when the sale is conducted in good faith in an arm's
length transaction, purchasers would be purchasing an unknown
quantity, at best, and a potential lawsuit, at worst. This would
discourage potential buyers from participating in foreclosure sales.
Additionally, even if they did buy, the price paid would reflect the
uncertainties of the title they acquired.5" By eliminating potential
challenges by the debtor to the purchaser's title, the Code's drafters
sought to protect defaulting debtors by maximizing the price paid at
foreclosure sales and, thereby, maximizing the amount of the surplus
to which the debtor is entitled, or, at least, minimizing the extent of
any deficiency for which the debtor is liable." The drafters also
sought to embody the commercial expectations of the parties involved
in foreclosure sales by limiting disputes over the conduct of sales to
legal actions between the debtor and creditor."
Despite these goals, the Code does not grant absolute protection
against all claimants. Specifically, purchasers are not protected from
creditors who have interests superior to the selling secured party, even
if they purchased in good faith." Additionally, purchasers are
defect in the sale procedure goes to the jurisdiction and validity of the whole sale and
therefore it is void and therefore there can be no purchaser for value.
Id.
56. HAwNCLAND, supra note 4, § 9-504:11, at 839.
57. The debtor is liable for any deficiency between the amount received through disposition
and the amount of the debt plus costs of repossession and resale, and is entitled to any surplus
received in excess of these amounts. U.C.C. § 9-504(2). The Code's drafters sought to
maximize the amount realized at sale by providing for informal sales mechanisms and permitting
disposition at private sale. Id. § 9-504 cmt. 1 (commenting that private sales of repossessed
collateral should be encouraged over public sales, because private sales often result in higher
prices "to the benefit of all parties"); wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson, 580 P.2d 505, 508-09
(Okla. 1978) (finding that clear intent of code was to permit seller flexibility in determining
method of sale; recognizing that private sale will often result in higher realization of value of
collateral); see Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMp. PROBS. 27, 43 (1951) (stating that aim of default provisions of article 9 "should be to
promote disposition of the collateral at the highest possible price"); see also Hall v. Owen County
State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that "drafters recognized typical
dismal results of sheriff's public sale" and opted to permit private sales through normal
commercial channels).
58. See U.C.C. § 9-507 (permitting recovery by debtor for damages sustained due to secured
party's failure to comply with article 9); OSCAR SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS (UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE) 133 (ALI-ABA 1963) (explaining that "[U.C.C.] Article Nine's
approach to foreclosure is designed to permit almost the same flexibility in the foreclosure sale
and liquidation of collateral as would be the case where a businessman ... sought to sell ...
goods in the ordinary course of business"); see also Proceedings 1949, supra note 20, at 71
(comments of Allison Dunham) (stating that "secured lender may sell in any manner with
requirement that he give notice").
59. U.C.C. § 9-504(4). Section 9-504(4) provides only that the purchaser, under
appropriate circumstances, takes free of the interests of the debtor, selling secured party, and
of creditors with interests subordinate to the sellers. See generally Starnes, supra note 4, at 564-66
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subject to the claims of the debtor orjunior creditors when they know
about the defects in the conduct of the sale, or act in collusion with
the secured party, other buyers, or the party conducting the sale or
generally do not act in good faith.6" These limitations on
purchasers' rights at foreclosure sales demonstrate that the Code
rejects absolute protection for all purchasers and, in some cases,
protection even for those who act in good faith.
One of the uniform laws regulating secured lending prior to the
introduction and adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA),6 had a much simpler and
broader approach to the protection of purchasers from secured
lenders. The UTRA included a provision designed to accomplish
essentially the same purposes as section 9-504(4). Section 6(3) (c) of
the UTRA provided that a good faith purchaser for value from an
entruster in possession under the Act, the creditor, took free of the
trustee's, debtor/owner's, interest, even if the sale would constitute
conversion of the property." Under this provision, the good faith
purchaser from a secured creditor was protected against claims of the
debtor even when the sale was completely unauthorized by the debtor
or the law.
Although the drafters of the Code presumably had knowledge of
this provision, they chose the more limited language of section 9-
504(4).63 Because of the limitations included in section 9-504(4), 4
(explaining and distinguishing parties' relative rights).
60. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (a)-(b); see also Pippin Way, Inc. v. Four Star Music Co., 2 B.R. 454,
464 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979) (explaining that, where terms of foreclosure sale were so highly
unusual and beneficial to merchant buyer as to put buyer on notice that sale was not
commercially reasonable, buyer was not good faith purchaser for value and thus did not take
free of debtor's interest in collateral).
61. 3A U.L.A. 577 (1981). The UTRA was originally proposed in 1933. Article 9 of the
U.C.C. "supersedes prior legislation dealing with such security devices as chattel mortgages,
conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens and assignments of accounts receivables," including
the UTRA. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt; see also id. § 9-102(2); Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute Bar Rule
in U.C.C. Foreclosure Sales: A Prescription for Waste, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 695, 722 n.148 (1993)
(explaining that U.C.C. § 9-504(4) was derived from UTRA).
62. UTRA § 6(3) (c) provided:
A purchaser in good faith and for value from an entruster in possession takes free
of the trustee's interest, even in a case which the entruster is liable to the trustee in
conversion.
3A U.L.A. at 582.
63. See 2 GILMoRE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1247-48 (commenting that U.C.C. article 9
drafters "followed [UTRA's] sensible provision but were, unfortunately, persuaded to spoil its
admirable simplicity by introducing unnecessary complications"). Interestingly, Professor Karl
Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of the Code, was also involved in the drafting of the UTRA. See
Proceedings 1949, supra note 20, at 65 (comments of Prof. Llewellyn) (discussing cross references
adopted from UTRA and applied to secured transactions portion of U.C.C.).
64. See 2 GILIORE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1248 (explaining that article 9 "does not go as
far as the UTRA [because] UTRAvalidated any sale by an entruster in possession [while] U.C.C.
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the Code does not go as far to protect purchasers at foreclosure sales
as the UTRA had gone.6" Professor Gilmore, in his seminal treatise
on article 9,66 concluded that the Code drafters by using the more
limited language of section 9-504(4), excluded from the section's
protection pre-default purchasers of collateral from secured credi-
tors.' It is not clear, however, whether this distinction was intended,
although it is the implication of the chosen language.0
Although the purchaser does not appear to be protected by the
general shelter rule of section 9-504(4) in this context, 9 some
protection may still be provided by the final sentence of the subsec-
tion.7" In addition to sheltering the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
from the debtor's claims where the debtor is in default, section 9-
504(4) further provides that generally the good faith purchaser takes
free of the rights of the debtor and the selling and subordinate
secured parties, even if the seller has failed to comply with the
requirements of article 9, part 5.71 Arguably, this provision applies
where a secured party repossesses and disposes of collateral without
the debtor being in default, because the secured party would clearly
section 9-504(4) covers only disposition by a secured party after default").
65. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1248. Professor Gilmore lamented that the Code
drafters (himself included) did not choose the broad and simple route of the UTRA, and
introduced unnecessary complications into U.C.C. § 9-504(4). Id. at 1247-48.
66. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 43.1.
67. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1248 (stating necessity, "under Article 9, [of]
distinguish[ing] between wrongful pre-default and wrongful post default transfers").
68. See generally Proceedings 1949, supra note 20, at 64-71 (discussing language and scope of
shelter provision ultimately adopted as UCC § 9-504(4)). During the early deliberations over
what was enacted as U.C.C. § 9-504(4), nothing was said about what effect, if any, a wrongful
declaration of default would have on the rights of the purchaser. Id. An early draft of the
Official Comment to U.C.C. § 9-504, however, seems to indicate that the drafters intended to
achieve, through U.C.C. § 9-504(4), the same result in protecting purchasers as that reached
under the UTRA. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Draft of Article IX Comments 1950), § 9-504
cmt. 2. The draft of the comment provided:
2. Subsection (3) provides that a purchaser from a lender in possession takes free of
any rights of the debtor even though the lender has not complied with the statutory
requirements of sale. This Subsection follows a similar provision in the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act and in the section on resale by a seller (Secti.n 2-706).
Id. The reference in this draft to the seller's breach of the requirements of sale, as well as the
comment ultimately adopted, still indicate that the drafters intended the protection of the
purchaser to extend only to instances where there were defects in the sale. See U.C.C. § 9-504
cmt. What protection, if any, a purchaser would receive when the debtor was not in default was
left unanswered.
69. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (stating that purchaser "takes free of all . . . rights even though
secured party fails to comply with requirements of this part").
70. Id. § 9-504(4) (b) (stating that "in any other case if the purchaser acts in good faith,"
he takes free of rights of debtor and junior secured creditors).
71. Id. § 9-504(4) (stating specifically that "[tihe purchaser takes free of all [the debtor's]
rights and interests even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this
Part or of anyjudicial proceedings" if they act in good faith in private sale or do not know of
secured party's failure to comply and did not collude in public sale).
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have failed to comply with the Code. The Official Comments make
clear, however, that the purchaser's rights arise only when the secured
party sells after default.72 Additionally, this provision appears to
permit a good faith purchaser to avail himself of the sheltering
provision of section 9-504(4), even though the secured party violated
the standards for repossession 73 or resale.74  Because the initial
rights granted in the shelter provision are predicated upon the
debtor's default, its protection apparently does not extend to cover
sales in the absence of a default.75 Accordingly, because the debtor
in the hypothetical was not in default, our purchaser is not protected
under section 9-504(4).
B. Other Law Governing the Purchaser's Rights
As just established, the right of the secured party to sell to a
purchaser for value, and the accompanying power to transfer the
debtor's rights, require the debtor's default. In the absence of
default, the secured party should have no such right or power.
76
There is no clear indication, however, that the drafters considered
what effect the absence of default would have on a dispute between
the subsequent purchaser and the original debtor. Professor Gilmore
recognized that section 9-504(4) protected purchasers of repossessed
collateral only where the sale was conducted after default.7 7  He
further acknowledged that article 9 was silent on what protection, if
any, good faith purchasers at foreclosure sales would receive if the
selling secured party wrongfully declared a default under the security
agreement.7" Thus, a purchaser must look to other applicable laws
for protection.
79
72. Official Comment 4 to § 9-504 states:
Subsection (4) provides that a purchaser for value from a secured party after default
takes free of any rights of the debtor and of the holders ofjunior security interests and
liens, even though the secured party has not complied with the requirements of this
Part or of any judicial proceedings.
Id. § 9-504 cmt. 4 (emphasis added).
73. See id. § 9-503 (describing conditions under which "self-help" is acceptable, and when
secured creditor must instead resort to judicial proceeding). If, for example, a self-help
repossession cannot be accomplished without a breach of the peace, the secured creditor must
resort to judicial proceedings. Id.
74. See id. § 9-504(3) (requiring that debtor receive notice of disposition of collateral, and
that all aspects of disposition be conducted in commercially reasonable manner).
75. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1248 (distinguishing pre-default transfers from
post-default transfers, and differing rights of purchasers attaching thereto).
76. See2 GILMORE, supranote 4, §§ 42.14,44.7, at 1176, 1246 (explaining that secured party
has wrongfully transferred to third party if transfer takes place before debtor's default).
77. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 44.7, at 1248.
78. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 42.14, at 1180.
79. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 42.14, at 1180.
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Having failed to qualify as a protected purchaser under section 9-
504(4), our buyer may look to article 2 of the Code to determine
what rights he received through the sale." Section 2-403(1) provides
generally that a purchaser acquires through a sale whatever rights or
title the seller had.8' If the selling secured party had good title, the
purchaser, in turn, received good title. Conversely, if the secured
party has less than good title, the purchaser generally receives that
lesser interest. Where, however, the selling secured party wrongfully
repossessed and sold the collateral, as in our hypothetical, the secured
party would not have acquired good title to the collateral, and could
not transfer good title to the good faith purchaser under this
82provision.
Section 2-403 further provides, however, that a good faith purchaser
for value obtains good title in a transfer from a seller with "voidable
title" acquired through a "transaction of purchase."13  If the selling
creditor obtained at least "voidable title" through a purchase
transaction, our purchaser, having acted in good faith and given
value, would receive good title through the foreclosure sale and, thus,
could successfully defend an action brought by the debtor to reclaim
the good.
Under section 2-403, to have the power to transfer good title to a
good faith purchaser for value, the transferor must (1) obtain
voidable title (2) through a "transaction of purchase."8 4 A possessor
80. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) provides that the sales aspect of the secured creditor's disposition of
the collateral, if it is a good, is governed by article 2. U.C.C. § 9-504(1).
81. Section 2-403(l) provides:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer good title
to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which was later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale," or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
Id. § 2-403(1); see also id. § 2-403 cmt. 1 (stating that basic policy of law allowing transfer of such
title as transferor has is generally continued and expanded in subsection (1)); United Road
Mach. Co. v.Jasper, 568 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that because subsequent
purchaser purchased in good faith from original purchaser, seller was estopped from asserting
that subsequent purchaser had no title to goods); PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY No. 6, reprinted in 3B U.L.A. 623-25 (1992)
(discussing "shelter principle" and its use to protect right to transfer).
82. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between title of
transferor and transferee of good).
83. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
84. SeeAmerican Standard Credit v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248,268 (5th Cir. 1981)
(explaining that under good faith purchaser for value rule of U.C.C., "sale to good-faith
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who has only void title to a good has absolutely no power to transfer
any rights in the good, even to a good faith purchaser.85  One who
has obtained voidable title to a good has the power under limited
circumstances, although not the right, to transfer better title to a
good faith purchaser for value. 6 For this reason, the distinction
between void title and voidable title obtained through a transaction
of purchase becomes critical.
The term "void" has been defined as applying to an event that is
absolutely "ineffective, inoperative, and incapable of ratification and
which thus has no force or effect so that nothing can cure it"87: a
person who obtains possession of the property without the consent of
the rightful owner has void itle;88 a thief obtains void title;89 one
who converts property acquires merely void itle;90 generally, one
purchaser for value cures the defects in seller's 'voidable' title; it cannot, however, cure 'void'
title"); Iola State Bank v. Bolan, 679 P.2d 720,726 (Kan. 1984) (holding that financing bank was
not good faith "purchaser" when obtaining voidable title through its debtor's sale of goods to
third party because "no reasonable man could find that the bank could deny that it had
knowledge of the nature of... the title"); Foley v. Product Credit Ass'n, 753 S.W.2d 876, 879
(Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "'principle of voidable title' protects creditor against charge
of conversion").
85. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Ring Power Corp., 450 So. 2d 1245, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (applying Florida law, which does not .llow thief to transfer tide to good faith purchaser);
Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 920 (Md. Ct. App. 1984) ("He who hath not cannot give.
.. "); see also Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE LJ. 1057,
1060 (1954) (discussing "cash sale theory," under which seller's power to transfer title ends in
presence of fraud); Daphne D. Sipes, Effects of Conversion and Trade Custom on Article 2 Titles, 11
AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 277, 278-81 (1987) (explaining that shelter theory does not apply to void
title).
86. U.C.C. § 2-403(1); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Carbajal, 645 P.2d 778, 781 (Ariz. 1982)
(holding that defaulting buyer in cash sale has voidable title and has limited power to transfer
title to good faith purchaser); Flemming v. Thompson, 343 A.2d 599, 600 (Del. 1975) (quoting
Delaware Code: "'A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer [and a] person with voidable title has power to transfer a value.'"); Maumer, supra
note 8, at 98 (commenting that converter who has obtained voidable title may pass good title
to third party acting in good faith); William L. Tabac, The Unbearable Lightness of Title Under the
UCC 50 MD. L. REv. 408, 422 (1991) (explaining that person with voidable tide may have power
to transfer good title to good faith purchaser for value because courts must "look beyond the
rights conferred by the contract of sale to perceptions of third party purchasers").
87. BLACK'S LAW DICnToNARY 1086 (6th ed. 1990).
88. See In re Hennessy, 494 A.2d 853, 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that voidable title
requires assent of original owner; otherwise, title is void).
89. See Bron & Root, 450 So. 2d at 1249 (holding that one in possession of stolen property
has no possessory or ownership right); Carlsen v. Rivera, 382 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. Ct. Dist. App.
1980) (stating that possessor of stolen items cannot convey good title or voidable title); Touch
of Class Leasing v. Mercedes-Benz Credit of Can., 591 A.2d 661, 667 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (stating that thieves acquire no title to stolen goods) (citing O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d
862, 867 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1980)); Marvin v. Connelly, 252 S.E.2d 562, 563 (S.C. 1979) (explaining
that absent assent of rightful owner, seller of stolen property conveys no title). A thief may,
however, transfer good title to money and negotiable instruments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 22, § 229 cmt. d; accord U.C.C. §§ 3-302, -305.
90. See Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, 723 P.2d 996, 999 (Or. 1986) (stating
that converters have no rights in collateral of security interests).
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who has possession, but no claim to title or authority to transfer the
good, has void title.9
"Voidable" describes an act that "may be avoided rather than an
invalid act which may be ratified."92 Voidable title is acquired when
the property is voluntarily delivered to another by the rightful owner,
typically with the understanding that some condition will be met.9"
A transfer of voidable title requires the initial intent of the true owner
to part with the goods, although the owner may be misled or
fraudulently induced to do so:"4 one who buys a good with a check
that is later dishonored acquires voidable title;9" one who receives a
good with the understanding that he will pay for it promptly in cash,
but fails to do so, obtains voidable title;96 one who receives a good
under false pretenses acquires voidable title.9" Simply put, voidable
title can be cured; void title cannot.9"
91. See Touch of Class Leasing, 591 A.2d at 667 (reiterating that parties merely converting
goods to own use after attaining possession through some manner other than transaction of
purchase do not possess even voidable title); O'Keefe, 416 A.2d at 867 (explaining that generally
thieves acquire no title); see also Courtright Cattle Co. v. Dolsen Co., 604 P.2d 522, 526 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1979) (holding that mere possession gives no authority to transfer title).
92. BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 87, at 1087.
93. See HAWKLAND, supra note 4, § 2-403:05, at 871-72; RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 14, § 9.6,
at 199; see also American Standard Credit v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 268 (5th Cir.
1981) (explaining that in order for purchaser to obtain voidable title, owner must deliver goods
with intent that purchaser become owner); Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 281 N.Y.S.2d
400, 403 (Civ. Ct. 1967) (stating that possession is not enough to create voidable title, as transfer
must be authorized by owner); Marvin, 252 S.E.2d at 563 (stating that concept of voidable title
depends on original owner's assent to transfer); Richard L. Barnes, Toward a NormativeFramework
for the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 TEMP. L REV. 117, 132 (1989) (stating that one principle of
voidable title is that true owner could not lose title through theft).
94. HAWKLAND, supra note 4, § 2-403:05, at 874 (noting that no title passed to purchaser
unless seller "voluntarily hand[s] over the goods"); Sipes, supra note 85, at 277-81 (explaining
that transferee receives voidable title if original owner initially intended to part with her interest
in good).
95. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b); see also In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1243 (5th Cir.)
(describing how buyers with subsequently dishonored checks attain voidable title transferable
to good faith purchasers), cet. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
96. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(c); see Collingwood Grain v. Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d 686, 690
(9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that initial buyer with voidable title has power to transfer good title
to good faith purchaser for value even though initial buyer fails to make required dash
payments); Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, 497 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (N.D. Il. 1980)
(reiterating that under U.C.C., purchaser acquires voidable title and power to transfer good title
even though purchaser has failed to pay for goods under "cash sale"); First Nat'l Bank v.
Carbajal, 645 P.2d 778, 781 (Ariz. 1982) (stating that purchaser who fails to pay seller obtains
voidable title even though transaction is "cash sale"); see also House of Stainless v. Marshall &
llsley Bank, 249 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis. 1977) (finding that buyer who obtains goods on credit
with understanding that seller will be promptly paid obtains voidable title).
97. A purchaser obtains voidable title where his "transferor was deceived as to the identity
of the purchaser.., or delivery of the good was procured through fraud," even if the fraud
constitutes a crime. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (a), (d).
98. See HAwKLAND, supra note 4, § 2-403:01, at 865 (explaining that "one having a 'voidable
title,' as distinguished from a 'void title,' had the power to pass a perfect title to a bona fide
purchaser").
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Under section 2-403, the rights of the purchaser of wrongfully
repossessed collateral depend on the selling creditor's rights.99 For
the purchaser to prevail under section 2-403, the secured creditor
must have obtained at least voidable title through the repossession.
As has been previously discussed, the Code does not give the
secured party the right to repossess when the debtor is not in default.
This is so because a secured creditor does not, merely by virtue of
having a security interest, obtain title to the good."' By virtue of
the security interest, the creditor obtains only a conditional property
interest 01 and obtains no higher right to the good than the Code
grants.' 2 Under the U.C.C., the creditor has no right to possess
and sell the collateral when the debtor is not in default.0 3 On the
other hand, the Code does not define the status of a secured creditor
who has wrongfully repossessed and sold the collateral.10 4 In an
effort to resolve uncertain situations caused by the Code's silence,
section 1-103 provides that common law principles supplement the
Code where the Code has not displaced the common law.105
Because the Code is silent on this issue, the common law must be
considered to determine the effect of the wrongful repossession, and
the nature of the secured creditor's resulting interest.
10 6
99. Currently, under the U.C.C., a transferee's rights are governed by the rights of his
transferor. Id. §§ 2-403, 9-504(4). For a thought-provoking challenge and proposed alternative
to this derivational approach, see generally Mautner, supra note 8 (proposing that conduct and
relative equities govern disputes over property between two innocent parties rather than rights
each has given to or derived from wrongdoer).
100. Tabac, supra note 86, at 441; see Cheyenne Mountain Bank v. Whetstone Corp., 787 P.2d
210, 212 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that at attachment of security interest, secured creditor
holds only lien on collateral, and, upon debtor's default, creditor holds inchoate possessory
interest).
101. See Cheyenne Mountain Bank, 787 P.2d at 212 (stating that after debtor defaults, secured
creditor holds inchoate possessory interest in disposition of property); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(stating that security interest "secures payment or performance of an obligation"); Trimble v.
Sonitrol of Memphis, 723 S.W.2d 633, 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that secured
creditor acquired only special property interest in debtor's collateral, giving creditor right to sell
collateral upon default in payment of debt). See generally 1 GILMORE, supra note 4, §§ 11.1 to
11.2, at 333-40 (defining nature of security interests).
102. Spickler v. Lombardo, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1500, 1508 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1.
1978) (stating that parties to secured transaction only have rights given to them by Code).
103. See U.C.C. §§ 9-501, -503, -504(1); Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop Livestock
Sales Ass'n, 261 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Wis. 1978).
104. See U.C.C. § 9-501 & cmts.
105. Id. § 1-103 (providing that, unless displaced, "the principles of law and equity, including
the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake and bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions"); see also Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Wathen, 414
A.2d 1261, 1264-65 (Md. 1980) (relying on U.C.C. § 1-103 to hold that debtor's remedy under
U.C.C. § 9-507(1) does not exclude common law remedy).
106. SeeWlTE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, §§ 25-16 to -17, at 1238, 1240-42 (discussing use
of common law tort liability to remedy wrongful repossession by awarding conversion damages
based on fair market value of collateral at time of conversion); see also Mercedes-Benz Credit
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The general rule is that a secured party who repossesses collateral
when the debtor is not in default is liable for conversion. 1°7 A cause
of action for conversion arises where a party intentionally exercises
dominion or control over the good of another so as to seriously
interfere with the owner's rights."' 8 Conversion can be committed
by dispossessing the true owner of the good"° or by disposing of the
good without the authority or consent of the owner.110 A secured
party converts collateral through interference with a debtor's
immediate and unconditional right to the good.' When the
secured party is not entitled to possession, as where the debtor is not
Corp. v. Morgan, 850 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Ark. 1993) (explaining that secured creditor is liable for
conversion if debtor was not in default when chattel repossessed); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 688 P.2d 42, 45 (Okla. 1984) (holding that creditor who repossessed when debtor was not
in default was liable for conversion).
107. See Chemical Sales Co. v. Diamond Chem. Co., 766 F.2d 364, 368 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that improper sale of collateral after repossession may constitute conversion where
creditor's actions seriously interfere with debtor's ownership rights); In re Buttram, 2 B.R. 92,
96 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1979) (finding that secured creditor who repossessed collateral after filing
of bankruptcy petition in violation of automatic stay was guilty of conversion); Pleasant v.
Warrick, 590 So. 2d 214, 217 (Ala. 1991) (finding no conversion because plaintiff was in
default); Friendly Credit Union v. Campbell, 579 So. 2d 1288, 1290-91 (Ala. 1991) (holding that
repossession of collateral by secured creditor is conversion where debtor is not in default); Day
v. Schenectady Discount Corp., 611 P.2d 568, 572 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that
improper sale of repossessed collateral by secured creditor may constitute conversion); Lincoln
v. Grinstead, 379 S.E.2d 671, 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that wrongful disposition of
repossessed collateral by party with security interest constitutes conversion); Mitchell 688 P.2d
at 44 (finding conversion where goods were repossessed when plaintiffwas not in default);Johns
v. Park, 773 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that creditor committed conversion
where security interest did not attach to debtor's property due to inadequate description in
security agreement); ITT Commercial Finance Co. v. Riehn, 796 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that secured creditor converts collateral when it deals with collateral in unlawful
manner). This is consistent with the Code's treatment of purchases from debtors when the sale
is in violation of a creditor's security interest. See, e.g., American Furniture Co. v. Extebank, 676
F. Supp. 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that buyer with whom debtor does not regularly
conduct business is liable for conversion, if sale to buyer interferes with security interest); Ranier
v. Gilford, 688 S.W.2d 753, 755-56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (holding transferee of original debtor
liable to secured creditor for conversion); First Pa. Banking & Trust Co. v. Liberati, 422 A.2d
1074, 1077-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding that purchaser who buys collateral subject to
perfected security interest is liable to secured creditor for conversion); see also Steve H. Nickles,
Enforcing Article 9 Security Interests Against Subordinate Buyers of Collatera 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
511, 520-36 (1982) (examining and explaining basis of buyers' liability to secured party for
conversion of collateral).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 22, § 222A; see Farmers State Bank v.
Haflich, 699 P.2d 553,558 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that conversion is unauthorized exercise
of right over goods of another); Frost v. Eggeman, 638 P.2d 141, 144 (Wyo. 1981) (explaining
that conversion occurs when people treat property belonging to others as their own, thus
denying true owner enjoyment of ownership rights).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 22, § 223(a).
110. Id. § 223(e).
111. See Andrews v. Mid-America Bank & Trust Co., 503 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (holding that creditor did not convert good because buyer did not have unconditional
and absolute right to immediate possession of good).
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in default,112 and unjustifiably repossesses the collateral, the secured
party is liable for conversion.1 3
A person who converts a good receives no rights to it, including the
power to transfer it; that is, the converter obtains void title. 4 In
Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans,115 the Oregon Supreme
Court addressed the rights of a purchaser from a converter, 16 and
the application of section 2-403's shelter provision in that context."7
In Mattson, the plaintiff had contracted for West Coast Lumber (not
a party to the action) to cut lumber from the plaintiff's land and
resell it with the plaintiff's approval."8 During the course of the
contract, West Coast entered the plaintiff's land and cut 285,000
board feet of lumber without the plaintiffs knowledge or permis-
sion,'19 thereby converting the lumber.2 ° Plaintiff initially sued
West Coast, seeking money damages for the conversion.12' During
the course of that litigation, Commercial Credit Business Loans
extended West Coast a line of credit secured by West Coast's
inventory, including the converted lumber.12 2  Under the Code,
Commercial Credit was therefore a purchaser of the lumber.
1 23
When West Coast filed for bankruptcy after losing the initial litigation,
Mattson sued Commercial Credit to reclaim any proceeds from the
sale of the lumber.
124
112. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (stating that U.C.C. §§ 9-501 and 9-503
condition right to repossess collateral upon debtor's default).
113. See Farmers State Bank, 699 P.2d at 558-59 (holding that unjustifiable taking of collateral
constituted conversion); Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Ass'n, 261
N.W.2d 127, 132 (Wis. 1978) (explaining that conversion occurs on creditor's wrongful
repossession when buyer has possession of good or is entitled to immediate possession).
114. See supra text accompanying note 91.
115. 723 P.2d 996 (Or. 1986).
116. Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, 723 P.2d 996, 998-1002 (Or. 1986).
117. Id. at 999.





123. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (defining "purchase" as including "taking by sale, discount,
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other transaction creating an
interest in property"). Section 1-201 (32) defines "purchase" broadly to include taking property
by "mortgage, pledge, lien, ... or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in
property." Id. A "purchaser" is defined by U.C.C. § 1-201(33). Granting a security interest
constitutes a purchase for purposes of the Code, and the secured creditor is therefore
considered a purchaser. See In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1243"(5th Cir.) (holding that
secured creditors are included in Code definition of purchasers), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976).
124. Mattson, 723 P.2d at 998.
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The Oregon Supreme Court held that West Coast acquired no title
or interest in the lumber by virtue of the conversion.'25  As a
purchaser from one with void title, Commercial Credit therefore
received only void title through the transaction and was not protected
by section 2-403(1). 126 Additionally, the court found that West
Coast acquired no rights to which Commercial Credit's security
interest in the lumber could attach. 27 Because Commercial Credit
received no valid interest in the lumber, Mattson could trace both the
lumber and the identifiable proceeds from its sale in Commercial
Credit's possession.
128
Other courts are generally in accord with the Mattson holding that
a transferee from a converter does not obtain good title. 129 Both at
common law and under section 2-403, one who has converted a good
does not have the power to transfer good title, even to a good faith
purchaser for value. The purchaser from the converter receives void
title, and thus loses to the property's rightful owner in a title
contest.1
30
Furthermore, voidable title for section 2-403 purposes must be
acquired under a "transaction of purchase.'' The Code defines
the term "purchase" broadly to encompass "any voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property." 32 Conversely, transfers of interests
that are not voluntary, and are consummated without the owner's
consent, are not purchases. 133  The broad definition of purchase
125. Id. at 999.
126. Id.
127. Id. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (c) requires that the debtor have rights in the collateral before
a security interest may attach to it. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (c).
128. Mattson, 723 P.2d at 1000.
129. See e.g., Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 1970)
(holding that converter had no title to convey to good faith purchaser for value); Inmi-Etti v.
Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 923 (Md. C. Spec. App. 1985) (finding that buyer of converted property
did not obtain good title); Bay Spring Forest Prods. v. Wade, 435 So. 2d 690, 694 (Miss. 1983)
(holding converter of chattel transfers no title to purchaser); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862,
867 (N.J. 1980) (stating that thieves acquire no title and could not transfer title to others).
130. Swift & Co., 426 F.2d at 1104 (stating that rightful owner of goods retains title to goods
after sale by converter and may follow goods into hands of good faith purchaser for value); see
also Peper v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 205 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947) (reiterating
that owner can reclaim property from innocent purchaser where owner was divested of property
without consent); Hertz Corp. v. Hardy, 178 A.2d 833, 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) (holding that
true owner of good can replevy it from good faith purchaser for value who received void title
through thief).
131. U.C.C. § 2-403(1); see also American Standard Creditv. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d
248, 268 (5th Cir. 1981); HAWaKAND, supra note 4, § 2-403:05, at 874 (explaining that only
voluntary transaction, which constitutes purchase under U.C.C., can create voidable title).
132. U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
133. An example of an involuntarily created interest is a lien creditor's interest acquired
through judicial process, which is not a purchase. Id. § 9-301(3) (defining lien creditor); see also
Citizens Bank v. Taggart, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729, 734 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding no policy reason to
188
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includes the initial granting of a security interest,"M which is, by
definition, a voluntary transfer of an interest in the debtor's proper-
ty.135  Repossession and disposition of the collateral in the absence
of the debtor's default, however, is not made with the debtor's
consent, and thus is involuntary.'36 The creditor's interest created
through the wrongful repossession, bare possession, is thus not
created voluntarily and should not qualify as a purchase transac-
tion.
137
The secured party who repossesses in the absence of a default has
converted the collateral. Therefore, the creditor, through the
repossession, does not acquire "voidable title" through a "transaction
of purchase," but merely acquires void title. The purchaser of the
repossessed collateral, thus, cannot avail itself of the shelter provision
of section 2-403(1). Through the sale, the purchaser only receives the
grant lien-creditor good faith purchaser status); National Shawmut Bankv. Vera, 223 N.E.2d 515,
517 (Mass. 1967) (finding that lien creditor was not purchaser because status was not voluntary);
Steven L. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in
Conveyancing Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 238-39 (1986) (stating that
lien creditor is not purchaser because lien was not acquired through voluntary transaction);
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A
Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV 683, 721 (1988) (noting
that lien creditors are treated differently under Code than purchasers). But see Dan S.
Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real Property: Rethinking the
Goals of the Recording System and Their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 160-61 (1988) (arguing
that differences between judicial lien creditors and purchasers are not important enough to
justify differential treatment). Other "non-purchasers" include a trustee in bankruptcy and an
assignee for the benefit of creditors. U.C.C. § 9-301(3); see also Bassett Furniture Indus. v. Wear,
583 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that, like lien creditor, trustee is not purchaser); C Tek
Software v. New York State Business Venture Partnership, 117 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1990) (stating that, under Code, bankruptcy trustee only has rights of lien creditor and
therefore is not purchaser).
134. U.C.C. §§ 9-103 cmt. 7, 1-201(32) (stating that purchase includes voluntary "taking by
mortgage, pledge, lien"); see also In reSamuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir.) (stating that
Code definition of purchaser includes persons taking interest by voluntary mortgage, pledge,
or lien), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
135. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1) (a) (limiting application of article 9 to transactions intended to
create security interests), 9-203(1) (a) (requiring agreement between parties for creation of
enforceable security interest).
136. See Cheyenne Mountain Bank v. Whitestone Corp., 787 P.2d 210, 212 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990) (stating that secured party's inchoate possessory interest in collateral arises upon debtor's
default).
137. In a standard security agreement, while the debtor generally agrees to permit the
secured creditor to repossess the collateral when the debtor is in default, this consent does not
extend to situations where the debtor has fully complied with the agreement's terms and
therefore is not in default. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (permitting secured creditor and debtor to agree
to debtor's cooperation in assisting creditor's repossession); see also 4 THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET.
AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 27.4 (1993) (proposing that security agreements include
standard provisions in which debtor agrees to repossession on default); AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS
§§ 253:4661-63, 253:4687 (1993) (stating rights of secured creditors to repossess collateral in
event of debtor's default).
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same title as his transferor had, void title.' The rightful owner of
the property can accordingly trace it into the hands of the purchas-
er."39 Neither the common law nor the Code as currently drafted
protects the purchaser at a foreclosure sale from claims of the debtor
if the debtor was not in default at the time of the sale.
140
III. DEBTOR'S REMEDIES AGAINST PURCHASER
At common law, the owner of converted goods can sue in trover for
money damages 141 or in replevin for possession of the goods.
42
These actions are available not only against the wrongdoer, but also
against subsequent innocent purchasers. 43  Because our hypotheti-
cal purchaser obtained no title to the property from the sale, the
138. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (allowing purchaser to receive all rights and title possessed by
transferor).
139. See Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property
in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 172, 216 (1983) (characterizing innocent
purchaser as constructive trustee from whom owner can retrieve property).
140. See supra text accompanying note 103.
141. See RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 14, § 5.4, at 43 (defining trover as action from which
titleholder may recover from converter value of property at time of conversion); see also
Janiszewski v. Behrmann, 75 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Mich. 1956) (recognizing that aggrieved party may
sue for money damages or, if wrongdoer disposed of property, may proceed in assumpsit to
recover amount wrongdoer received).
142. See RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 14, § 5.4, at 44 (describing replevin as action to recover
converted chattel); see also Bryant v. Sears Consumer Fin. Corp., 617 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (La. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that traditional remedy for conversion is return of property and if property
cannot be returned, money damages equal to value of property at time of conversion).
143. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 1970)
(holding that owner may follow goods to bona fide third purchaser, even though purchaser
acted in good faith and lacked knowledge of wrongful conversion); Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d
917, 924 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1985) (recognizing that innocent party is liable to owner even
though innocent party took possession of chattel without knowledge, or even reason to know,
that transferor had no power to transfer proprietary interest); Mattson v. Commercial Credit
Business Loans, 723 P.2d 996, 1000-01 (Or. 1986) (considering commercial practicality of tracing
proceeds of converted goods into hands of subsequent parties until chattel reaches bond fide
purchaser); Frost v. Eggeman, 638 P.2d 141. 145 (Wyo. 1981) (requiring purchaser to pay owner
rent as restitution, even though purchaser entered premises believing he acted under color of
law); Oesterle, supra note 139, at 216 (explaining that owner can sue innocent purchaser even
if wrongdoer is solvent and available to be sued). The only intention required on the part of
a converter is the intention to exercise control over the good; the party need not intend to
deprive the rightful owner of the good, nor even know that another person claims to be the
rightful owner. SeeShaw's D.B. & L. v. Fletcher, 580 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex. CL App. 1979) (stating
that defendant should ascertain ownership rights of transferor, and that defendant's mere
possession of owner's property constitutes conversion); see also Andrews v. Mid-America Bank &
Trust Co., 503 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (I1. App. CL 1987) ("The essence of conversion is not
acquisition by the wrongdoer but a wrongful deprivation of the owner thereof."). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 203 (1937) (limiting liability of innocent converter to value of
property converted because there is no conscious wrongdoing that can be deterred);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 22, §§ 222A-223 (defining conversion as
"intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the
right of another to control it that the actor mayjustly be required to pay the other the value of
the chattel").
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debtor, as the rightful owner, may replevy it from the purchaser's
possession. The debtor could also elect to seek damages from the
purchaser equal to the fair market value of the converted proper-
ty.1
44
The right of replevin may be conditioned, however, on the debtor's
paying the debt to the purchaser.145  In pre-Code cases, where a
pledgee14 6 sold the collateral, thereby converting it, the purchaser
acquired no title, but was entitled to be subrogated in equity to the
pledgee/seller's rights on the debt against the pledgor (debtor)1 47
This subrogation right was limited to the return of the purchase
price. 48 This is analogous to the hypothetical situation, in that the
sale is by a secured creditor who has possession. In the case of a
pledge, however, the pledgee's initial possession was rightful, whereas
in our hypothetical situation the secured creditor's possession of the
collateral was wrongful.
The Code seems to support this common law right. Section 9-506
provides the debtor with the right to redeem the collateral after
repossession and before sale or disposition under section 9-504.141
144. See, ag., Inmi-Etti, 492 A.2d at 924 (awarding damages equal to fair market value of
property at time of conversion);Janiszewski, 75 N.W.2d at 80 (stating general rule that measure
of damages is value at time of conversion); Mattson, 723 P.2d at 998 (limiting plaintiff's options
to recovery of converted lumber from third parties or recovery of sales proceeds from
converter); Fros4 638 P.2d at 144 (determining damages by value of property converted and
placing burden of proof on plaintiff if value is disputed). The owner may also be entitled to
damages for the reasonable value of the use of the property while it was in possession of the
converter. Id. at 145.
145. 2 GILMoRE, supra note 4, § 42.14, at 1179 ("The debtor should be entitled to redeem
his property from the transferee on tendering the amount of the secured obligation and
payment to the transferee would discharge the obligation.").
146. SeeMcLemore v. Louisiana State Bank, 91 U.S. 27, 28 (1875) (holding that pledgee has
duty to "take that care of the pledge which a careful man bestows on his own property");
RAUSENBUSH, supra note 14, § 15.6, at 484 ("A pledgee, as one to whom the goods of another
are delivered for a special purpose, is a bailee of the property in his possession."). A pledgee
under common law is equivalent to a secured creditor in possession of the collateral for
purposes of perfection under the U.C.C. Id.
147. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 42.14, at 1179 (explaining that purchaser is subrogated in
equity to pledgee's rights against debtor to prevent unsatisfactory result of purchaser losing
property to owner and converter being repaid debt by owner); see also Talty v. Freedman's Say.
& Trust Co., 93 U.S. 321, 325 (1876) (allowing third party to recover from converter only after
third party has paid off owner's claim).
148. See 2 GIlmoRE, supra note 4, § 42.14, at 1179 (stating that debtor may redeem property
when he has tendered amount of secured obligation).
149. U.C.C. § 9-506 provides:
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a
contract for its disposition under Section 9-504 or before the obligation has been
discharged under Section 9-505(2) the debtor or any other secured party may unless
otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment
of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses reasonably incurred
by the secured party in retaking, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition,
in arranging for the sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and not
prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses.
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The debtor may redeem the collateral by satisfying the obligations,
including the entire debt if it has been appropriately accelerated.'
Because no sale was properly made under section 9-504, which
requires the debtor's default,15' the debtor's section 9-506 right of
redemption should continue despite the foreclosure sale.'52
Furthermore, the debtor should not, as a result of the secured
creditor's wrongful act, lose the benefit of her bargain, the use of the
money lent. While a secured creditor may accelerate a debt and
require immediate payment of the entire balance if the parties'
agreement so provides, the creditor may only do so if the debtor is in
default,'53 or if the creditor, in good faith, deems itself insecure."'
While good faith is generally considered to be a subjective standard,
requiring only honesty in fact, -5 any attempt by our hypothetical
creditor to accelerate the debt caused by the creditor's own negli-
gence should not meet even that minimal standard.'56 Thus, in the
U.C.C. § 9-506.
150. Id.; see also id. § 9-506 cmt. (requiring debtor to fulfill all obligations in one installment
if agreement contains acceleration clause).
151. Id. § 9-504 (permitting secured party to "sell, lease or othenvise dispose of any or all of
the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or
processing" after default).
152. See HAWKIAND, supra note 4, § 9-506:04, at 878 ("An improper disposition under section
9-504 or an improper strict foreclosure under section 9-505 means that the period of
redemption under section 9-506 has not ended, and thus the debtor and any other secured party
still have the right to redeem the collateral.").
153. HAWEKLAND, supra note 4, § 9-501:03, at 702 (explaining that acceleration is typically
triggered by certain defined events); WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-3, at 1191 ("Sccurity
agreements almost universally provide that under certain circumstances the secured party may
accelerate the maturity of the debt and cause all payments to become immediately due and
payable."); see also Bowen v. Danna, 637 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Ark. 1982) (finding that good faith
of creditor is unnecessary where right to accelerate is conditioned on occurrence of event that
is completely under control of debtor); Sheet Metal Workers Local # 76 Credit Union v.
Hufnagle, 295 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Minn. 1980) (holding that right to accelerate debt on default
is not implied in agreement where agreement contains no express acceleration clause); General
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Castiglione, 360 A.2d 418, 422 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (holding that
in absence of acceleration clause, installment payments could not be accelerated upon default);
J.R. Hale Contracting Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M. 1990) (interpreting
U.C.C. as requiring honest subjective belief on part of creditor that debtor's default was
reasonable).
154. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (defining insecurity as good faith belief that prospect of payment or
performance is impaired).
155. SeeWatseka First Nat'l Bank v. Ruda, 552 N.E.2d 775. 779 (Il. 1990) (recognizing both
that majority of courts find, and Code drafters intended, that good faith standard for
acceleration of debt be subjective); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (defining good faith as "honesty
in fact in the conduct or transaction").
156. See Watseka First Nat'1 Bank, 552 N.E.2d at 782 (holding that creditor met subjective
standard of good faith where there was no evidence that creditor did not have in its possession
information it claimed caused it to accelerate debt); Lane v.John Deere Co., 767 S.W.2d 138,
142 (Tenn. 1989) (construing § 1-208 good faith standard as requiring creditor to act with
honest belief that debtor's ability to perform is impaired, and prohibiting creditor from abusing
acceleration clause); State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977) (interpreting
§ 1-208 to require some reasonable justification for accelerating debt).
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absence of some evidence of a good faith belief in the insecurity of
the debt or the debtor's default, the creditor cannot accelerate the
debt, and the debtor retains the right to make payments, according
to the party's agreement, over time. Redemption would, therefore,
only require that the debtor remain current on the secured obliga-
tion.
By subrogating the purchaser to the amounts due for redemption
of the collateral, the purchaser would receive some compensation for
the loss of the asset, although potentially less than they paid and less
than the benefit for which they bargained. A debtor, however, may
attempt to defeat the subrogation claim of the purchaser as many
jurisdictions deny to a wrongfully repossessing secured creditor all
further claims on the debt or the collateral. 5 ' In those jurisdic-
tions, because the creditor has no further claims against the debtor,
arguably there is nothing to which the purchaser can be subrogated.
This result, however, seems to leave the debtor unjustly enriched
receiving both the return of the collateral and the discharge of the
debt.1
5 8
A debtor may further defend against a purchaser's restitution action
by counterclaiming for damages arising from the debtor's lost use of
the good from the time of repossession to the time the debtor
reclaimed it. In an action for equitable restitution, the party who
received the unjust enrichment cannot be made worse off than he was
before receiving the value for which restitution is sought. 59 If the
debtor has sustained damages due to lost use of the collateral, the
debtor may be entitled to offset those losses against any amount
recoverable by the purchaser."6
157. See supra note 14 (citing numerous authorities for proposition that debtor has claim
against creditor who repossessed property in bad faith).
158. 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 42.14, at 1179 (explaining that purchaser has subrogation
right to prevent his losing property and someone else receiving payment of debt).
159. Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Payor Bank's Right to Recover Mistaken Payments:
Survival of Common Law Restitution Unde roposed Revisions to Uniform Commercial CodeArticles 3 and
4, 65 IND. LJ. 779, 786-87 (1990) (recognizing, as defense to restitution, argument that
restitution would result in loss to defendant if defendant is not wrongdoer but merely party from
whom plaintiff is seeking recovery); see also RESTATEMENT OF RSrITUTION, supra note 143, § 149
(stating that purpose of restitution is to make plaintiff whole, but amount defendant must repay
is based on defendant's tortious conduct or negligence of both parties in creating situation
giving rise to right of restitution).
160. SeeHimebaugh v. Chalker, 245 N.W. 576,577 (Mich. 1932) (reducing damages assigned
by value of purchaser's use of land in equitable action for rescission); Bartlett v. Smith, 109 N.W.
260, 261 (Mich. 1906) (allowing plaintiff to recover payments and reasonable value of
improvement made in good faith less value of use of premises); Frost v. Eggeman, 638 P.2d 141,
145 (Wyo. 1981) (holding, in conversion action, that innocent purchaser of good at invalid
judicial foreclosure sale is liable to owner for reasonable value of use of property while in
purchaser's possession). A plaintiff that successfully replevies a good may also recover damages
for losses due to the detention and depreciation of the good. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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The purchaser should be entitled to recover from the debtor only
the amount by which the debt was reduced due to the sale because
that is the extent to which the debtor has been unjustly enriched.
That amount would equal the purchase price less (1) the incidental
fees and costs of the foreclosure sale that were credited against the
sale proceeds, and (2) any damages sustained by the debtor due to
loss of use of the collateral. 6
Under either the common law or the Code the purchaser would,
at best, be entitled only to the periodic payments under the security
agreement for which the debtor is obligated. 6 2 Additionally, under
the common law, the purchaser's subrogation in equity was limited to
the lesser amount of the debt or the purchase price, 63 thus depriv-
ing the purchaser of the benefit of his bargain. The common law
solution accordingly may be unattractive to a purchaser who did not
bargain for the return of the purchase price paid over time.
16 4
Where the collateral is unique, as in the hypothetical, even full
repayment of the purchase price may be an unsatisfactory solution
from the purchaser's perspective.
Under both the Code and the common law, the hypothetical
debtor may replevy the automobile from the purchaser because she
has good title and the purchaser has void title. The purchaser may
be subrogated to future payments due from the debtor until the price
paid, less costs and other damages, is returned. The purchaser may
TORTS, supra note 22, § 922 cmL b (allowing recovery of damages for detention and harm to
chattel as well as expenses of recapture if property is recaptured without consent of tortfeasor);
see also, e.g., Garoogian v. Medlock, 592 F.2d 997, 1002 (8th Cir. 1979) (basing amount of
damages on fair rental value of property and damages to property willfully inflicted by
defendant); White Motor Credit Corp. v. Sapp Bros. Truck Plaza, 249 N.W.2d 489, 493-94 (Neb.
1977) (awarding damages for wrongful detention because defendant owed duty of reasonable
care to prevent damages and pilferage).
161. SeeRESTATEMENT OF REsrTTION, supra note 143, § 43 (entitling person who mistakenly
discharges duty of another because he believed it to be his duty to restitution from that other
person).
162. See Ricklefs v. Clemens, 531 P.2d 94, 100 (Kan. 1975) (granting plaintiff damages equal
to difference between property represented to plaintiff by defendant and actual value of
property when received); Theobald v. Sprouse, 257 So. 2d 516, 518 (Miss. 1972) (limiting
plaintiff's recovery to purchase money paid plus interest).
163. See RESTATEMENT OF RESITION, supra note 143, §§ 43, 162 (preventing unjust
enrichment by limiting recovery of subrogating party).
164. See RESTATEMENT OF RESrT ON, supra note 143, § 4(d) (creating constructive trust
to prevent unjust enrichment of person who has equitable duty to convey title to another
property). The purchaser may also seek to retain possession of the collateral to secure
repayment of the subrogated debt, particularly in view of the fact that the purchaser did not
bargain to be a financier. See id. (granting restitution by placing lien on disputed item). As the
subrogee to the secured creditor's rights under the contract, however, the purchaser would
receive, at best, a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral as provided in the original
agreement between the debtor and secured creditor. See id. §§ 4(d), 43 (treating transaction
as though rights were specifically assigned rather than mistakenly conveyed).
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prefer, however, to seek immediate relief from the selling secured
party, in lieu of taking the debtor's payments over time.
IV. PURCHASER'S RIGHTS AGAINST SELLING SECURED PARTY
A. The Warranty of Title Under Article 2
If the debtor replevies the collateral from the purchaser, the next
issue to consider is whether the purchaser has a remedy against the
secured creditor, who failed to convey good title. Equity seems to
require that the creditor, at a minimum, be obligated to return the
monies paid to it by purchaser. Fairness dictates that the actor who
caused the conflict should bear the ultimate responsibility for making
the other parties whole again.'65 This conclusion is not compelled,
however, under the current language of the Code.166
The Code implies in most contracts for the sale of goods "a
warranty by the seller that... the title conveyed shall be good, and
its transfer rightful."'6 7 In the hypothetical, this warranty, if given
by the bank, would clearly have been breached because the bank had
no right to sell the good to the purchaser, and did not convey good
title as required. This would entitle the purchaser to damages under
article 2.1'
The warranty, however, is not implied in sales where the circum-
stances "give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does
not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such
right or title as he ... may have."'69 It would seem that no circum-
165. SeeHAwKLAND, supra note 4, § 2-312:08, at 406 (requiring wrongdoer to account for fair
worth of property).
166. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (warranting title, but not stating explicitly who is responsible if
property is encumbered).
167. Id. § 2-312(1) (a). A warranty is excluded only when the contract contains specific
language to the contrary or when the circumstances are such that the buyer should reasonably
know the seller does not claim title. Id. § 2-312(2).
168. See, e.g., Ricklefs v. Clemens, 531 P.2d 94, 100 (Kan. 1975) (holding defendant liable
for damages to buyer for breach of warranty of title, although he was innocent seller of stolen
vehicle); Riggs Motor Co. v. Archer, 240 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951) (entitling innocent
buyer to recover damages for breach of title warranty from innocent seller of stolen property);
Theobald v. Sprouse, 257 So. 2d 516, 518 (Miss. 1972) (permitting owner to recover purchase
price plus interest from purchaser); see also U.C.C. § 2-714(2) ("The measure of damages for
breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."). Buyers are also
typically entitled to recover incidental and consequential damages. Id. §§ 2-714(3), -715.
169. U.C.C. § 2-312(2); see also, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. Equitable Fin. Management, 708
F. Supp. 678, 683 (W.D. Pa.) (finding that no warranty of title attached to sale where buyer was
to originally purchase machinery through broker for price of $123,000, but consummated sale
10 days later directly with seller for $100,000 based on court's view that suspicious circumstances
should have put buyer on notice of potential claims against machinery), af'd, 882 F.2d 81 (3d
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stances in the hypothetical sale gave the purchaser reason to know
that the bank did not claim to at least have the right to transfer the
automobile as against the debtor. According to Official Comment 5
to section 2-312, however, the warranty of title does not attach to a
sale by a foreclosing secured party.170  Courts that have considered
the issue have generally agreed that the exceptional circumstances
present at a foreclosure sale by a secured party or a judicial sale,
Cir. 1989); Simmons Mach. Co. v. M & M Brokerage, 409 So. 2d 743, 752-53 (Ala. 1982)
(holding that warranty of title does not attach either to sale or trade-in of good where buyer
knows of possible security interest in good); Potter v. Owens, 535 So. 2d 173, 174-75 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1988) (deciding that documents and circumstances of transaction that purported to sell
interest in portable building attached to leased trailer gave buyers reason to know that no
warranty of title was made); Sumner v. Fel-Air, Inc., 680 P.2d 1109, 1112-13 (Alaska 1984)
(characterizing as question of fact whether circumstances of purchase of airplane from lessee
excluded warranty of tile); Maroone Chevrolet v. Nordstrom, 587 So. 2d 514, 517 (Fla. Dist. CL
App. 1991) (reversing trial court's failure to submit to jury question whether circumstances of
sale, which buyer arranged with third party and which was consummated through seller/dealer
for purposes of financing, were sufficient to give buyer notice of potential problems with title);
Shelly Motors, Inc. v. Bortnick, 631 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Haw. CL App. 1981) (finding that sales
transaction, where seller tells buyer that he is only conveying whatever interest seller has and
that title is "open," creates genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on
warranty of title claim);Jones v. Linebaugh, 191 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Mich. CL App. 1971) (ruling
that whether buyer had reason to know that seller was not claiming to have title, where seller
said he would try to obtain title from owner, was question forjury). For examples of unique
sales transactions that would not give a buyer reason to know that the warranty of title was
excluded, see Spillane v. Liberty MuL Ins. Co., 317 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (Civ. CL 1970) (attaching
warranty of title to sale by insurer after insurer took assignment of ownership upon assured
party's payment of claim), and John St. Auto Wrecking v. Motors Ins. Corp., 288 N.Y.S.2d 281,
284 (Dist. Ct 1968) (finding implied warranty of title where insurer sold repossessed
automobiles and purchaser had no way of knowing title was limited to what defendant could
convey).
170. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmL 5. The comment provides that:
Subsection (2) recognizes that sales by sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors and
persons similarly situated are so out of the ordinary commercial course that their
peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer and therefore no personal
obligation is imposed upon the seller who is purporting to sell only an unknown or
limited right.
Id.; see Vend-A-Matic v. Foothill Capital Corp., 37 B.R. 838, 841-42 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984)
(attaching no warranty of title to secured creditor's sale of bankrupt debtor's assets); Steve H.
Nickles, Rights and Remedies Between UCC Article 9 Secured Parties with Conflicting Security Interests in
Goods, 68 IOWA L. REv. 217, 254 (1983) (noting that buyers at forced sale were traditionally
required to assume risk that superior encumbrances would survive disposition of property to
them). But see Bogestad v. Anderson, 173 N.W. 674, 675 (Minn. 1919) (ruling that warranty of
title will be implied in foreclosure sale of chattel mortgage under pre-U.C.C. common law);
Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the
Standard Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337,392 n.219 (1993) (postulating
that buyer of repossessed collateral may have warranty of title claim against selling junior
secured creditor if senior creditor enforces claim against collateral); Hogan, supra note 12, at
256 (stating that "there is no caveat emptor in relation to title" in sale under U.C.C. § 9-504(4)
that protects purchaser as long as he is not party to deficiencies of resale). Members of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recognize that under U.C.C. §
2-312 and its Official Comments, as currently written, no warranty of title attaches to either a
judicial or foreclosure sale. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) reporters' explanatory note 3, at 11
(Discussion Draft, Sept. 2, 1993).
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noted in the comments to section 2-3 1 2,m give the buyer notice
sufficient to preclude the attachment of the warranty of title.7 2
Although the general rule is that no warranty of title attaches in a
foreclosure sale, this rule developed primarily in cases in which the
defect was in the original title of the debtor, and not caused by
actions of the secured seller. 73 Under the common law, sellers who
were not the owner and did not represent themselves as the owner
did not warrant the title of the person who was believed to be the
true owner.1 74 The courts believed that the purchaser could himself
determine whether the property was encumbered or subject to liens
or claims, and that the seller was often in no better position to
discover title defects than the purchaser.
175
171. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 5.
172. See, e.g., Vend-A-Matic, 37 B.R. at 841-42 (finding that no warranty of title attached to sale
by secured creditor of bankrupt debtor's assets); Harris Intertype Corp. v. Robertson, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 159, 165 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (refusing to imply warranty of title in resale of collateral by
secured party after debtor's default); Stuart v. American Sec. Bank, 494 A.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C.
1985) ("[T]he doctrine of caveat emptor applies to foreclosure sales because a trustee makes no
warranty of title and is generally subject to no duty to investigate or describe outstanding
licensor encumbrances."); Marvin v. Connelly, 252 S.E.2d 562, 563 (S.C. 1979) (denying
purchaser warranty of title from purchase of property at judicial sale); First State Bank v.
Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914,924 (Tex. CL App. 1993) (holding that "one who bids upon property
at foreclosure sale does so at his own peril"); Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 723
(Tex. CL App. 1985) (refusing to grant warranty of title to foreclosure purchaser when deed of
trust was void); Feldman v. Rucker, 109 S.E.2d 379, 385 (Va. 1959) (applying doctrine of caveat
emptor to foreclosure sale carried out under deed of trust). This rule originally developed at
common law. See, e.g., Harris v. Lynn, 25 Kan. 281, 285-86 (1881) (disallowing warranty of title
in judicial sale and placing burden on plaintiff to prove agreement otherwise); Bogestad, 173
N.W. at 675 (recognizing that if there was mortgage on property at time of sale, there was
representation of warranty against prior encumbrances); Cohn v. Ammidown, 24 N.E. 944, 944
(N.Y. 1890) (denying warranty of title where circumstances made clear that defendant
transferred only interest he held); see also 47 Am.JUR. 2DJudicial Sales §§ 262-263 (1969) (stating
prevailing view that there is generally no warranty of title at judicial sale and that doctrine of
caveat emptor applies); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON
LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES Acr § 220, at 566-67 (Rev. ed. 1948) (explaining that those
who sell by virtue of authority in fact or law are not liable for lack of title unless they expressly
warrant title). The common law rule was codified, first, in 1906 in § 13 of the Uniform Sales
Act, 1A U.L.A. 88, official cmt. (1989), and then in its successor, article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
173. See, e.g., Vend-A-Mati4 37 B.R. at 841 (finding that assets sold after abandonment did not
include vending machines because vending machines were not included in sales contract); Harris
Intert)rpe Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (concluding that purchaser was aware that title passed by
seller was defective); see also Michie v. National Bank, 558 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Mo. CL App. 1977)
(recognizing no warranty of title by lender in foreclosure sale of real estate under deed of trust
where debtor's interest was life estate but purchaser expected to receive fee simple).
174. WILLISTON, supra note 172, § 220, at 566-67 (likening seller to agent because seller can
give no more title than owner had); see also Bassett v. Lockard, 60 Ill. 164, 165 (1871) ("[T]he
goodness of the title must be at the purchaser's own risk."); Neal v. Gillaspy, 56 Ind. 451, 453
(1877) (comparing purchaser atjudicial sale with purchaser of real estate who conveys property
without covenant).
175. Stuar4 494 A.2d at 1338 (advising purchaser to make his own investigation before
turning over his deposit); Barnard v. Duncan, 38 Mo. 170, 186 (1866) (stating that "where facts,
or means of information, concerning the condition and value of the thing sold are equally
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Where the debtor is not in default, however, that logic does not
hold. The purchaser cannot protect his interests through a search of
the public records because the issue is the circumstance of default,
not any title encumbrance; the breach is not due to the owner's
defective title, but the inability of the selling secured party to transfer
title because the debtor is not in default. Additionally, the seller's
knowledge of the defect is dearly superior to that of the purchaser as
only the debtor and secured seller are parties to the agreement upon
which the foreclosure is based.
A few cases have held that a purchaser may recover from a
foreclosing seller for the seller's failure to convey good tile due to
the seller's own conduct. An early example was Bogestad v. Ander-
son.176 In Bogestad, mortgage collateral, a team of horses, was sold
in an invalid foreclosure sale.1" The horses' original owner alleged
that because the mortgage under which they were sold had been
satisfied, the ensuing sale was invalid." 8 The Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled that while the purchaser at a foreclosure sale generally
does not receive a warranty of title against prior encumbrances, he
does receive a warranty, or at least a representation, that the sale is
made under a valid and existing mortgage. 179 The court held that
if, on remand, the trial court determined that the mortgage had in
fact been discharged, the purchaser was entitled to a return of the
purchase price paid. 8 ' The court thus drew a distinction between
the seller warranting the title of the original owner and warranting
that the right to sell exists, with the purchaser recovering only for a
breach of the latter.8' The court made this finding, however, with
minimal discussion of, or citation to, any authority.
82
A more recent case also recognized this distinction and permitted
the successful bidder at a foreclosure sale to recover contract damages
accessible to both parties, and nothing is said or done which tends to impose on the other, or
to mislead him, there is no fraud in which the law can notice").
176. 173 N.W. 674 (Minn. 1919).
177. Bogestad v. Anderson, 173 N.W. 674, 674-75 (Minn. 1919). In an earlier case between
the debtor and lender, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the mortgage debt had been
discharged when the debtor made a partial payment of the debt and gave the lender a new
note, which was not secured by the collateral. Anderson v. Willson, 157 N.W. 582, 583 (Minn.
1916).
178. Bogestad, 173 N.W. at 675. Despite its earlier decision in Willson, the court held that the
judgment in the Willson case was not evidence of the discharge. Id. The court went on to note





182. Id. The only authority given by the court was a reference to the English law of pledges.
Id. (citing Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500 (1849)).
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from the seller who failed to convey title due to its erroneous
foreclosure on a mortgage. In Basiliko v. Pargo Corp.,8 the lender
scheduled a trustee's sale of a parcel of real property, pursuant to a
deed of trust, based on the borrower's default.184 A few minutes
before closing time on the day before the sale, the borrower cured
the delinquency, vitiating the default." 5 Although immediately and
properly credited, the payment did not come to the attention of the
selling trustees until after the sale." 6 At the sale, the plaintiff,
Basiliko, was the successful bidder and secured his bid with a
deposit."7 Shortly thereafter, Basiliko contracted to sell the proper-
ty to Pargo Corporation, which then contracted to sell it to another
party.8 On the settlement date, the trustees refused to consum-
mate the sale to Basiliko, advising him that they were not authorized
to sell the property because of the debtor's payment." 9 The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held that Basiliko was entitled to
recover damages from the trustees for loss of the benefit of his
bargain due to the trustees' breach of the executory sales con-
tract.190
The court's opinion centered on the correct measure of damages
for breach of an executory contract for the sale of real estate. 91 As
a threshold issue, however, the court considered the viability of the
purchaser's cause of action against the lender and its agents. 2 The
court held that the general rule of caveat emptor in foreclosure sales
did not apply where the seller failed to convey title because it lacked
the initial authority to conduct the sale.193 According to the court,
"the rule of caveat emptor can provide no basis for exempting the
foreclosure sale vendor from the usual obligation that 'a vendor is
bound to know that he can deliver that which he professes to
sell."" 4 The court also noted that to deny the purchaser recovery
would unfairly place the risk of the seller's mistake on the buyer.'95
183. 532 A.2d 1346 (D.C. 1987)






190. Id. at 1348-50.
191. Id. at 1347-49 (considering whether purchaser was entitled to damages sustained due
to lost benefit of bargain, or whether recovery was instead limited to return of deposit paid plus
interest and expenses).
192. Id. at 1349.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Trans World Airlines v. Skyline Air Parts, 193 A.2d 72, 75 (D.C. 1963)).
195. Id.
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While the court clearly intended to reach an equitable solution
between the parties, and probably accomplished it, this court, as had
the court in Bogestad, did so with little support from prior authori-
ties.1
96
These decisions provide some grounding for a cause of action by
our purchaser against the lender for its failure to convey good
title.1 97 Each case is substantially similar to the hypothetical in that
the seller's own conduct caused the failure to convey good title to the
foreclosure purchaser.98 The distinction between warranting the
owner's title and warranting the seller's authority to sell' 99 seems
both logical and equitable, as the selling secured party has no
particular knowledge of the former, but has both knowledge and
control of the latter. Yet, since being decided, neither case has been
relied on as authority, even within its own jurisdiction.
0 0
Moreover, other cases have rejected the distinction, finding that no
warranty of tidle exists even where the sale was void due to the seller's
actions. 01 The Texas Court of Appeals, for example, has gone so
196. See id. (relying on GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES (2d ed.
1970); Trans World Airlines, 193 A.2d at 72. Trans World Airlines, however, did not arise in the
context of a foreclosure sale. Id. at 73 (arising from breach of contract to deliver airline
equipment). The case addressed only whether a seller can raise impossibility of performance
as a defense to a breach of contract action where the seller's actions caused the impossibility.
Id. at 74-75. The section of the Osborne treatise cited by the court in Basiliko merely discusses
the general rule that there is no warranty of title in a foreclosure sale except to the extent that
the seller makes misrepresentations. OSBORNE, supra, § 344, at 741. This section could arguably
support recovery in a situation similar to Basiliko, if the court found that the seller impliedly
made a misrepresentation by conducting the sale without authority. The D.C. Court ofAppeals,
however, did not find that the seller impliedly made a misrepresentation. Basiliko, 532 A.2d at
1349. The court simply stated, without support, that the rule of caveat emptor does not apply
when the failure to convey title was caused by the seller's lack of authority to sell. Id.
197. This cause of action could be recognized either under U.C.C. § 2-312, for a breach of
the warranty of title, or at common law or equity. See Basiliko, 532 A.2d at 1348 (granting
damages to purchaser against seller who breaches contract for sale of property measured by
difference between contract price and fair market value); Bogestad v. Anderson, 173 N.W. 674,
675 (Minn. 1919) (finding limited warranty that seller had authority to sell and transfer title in
chattel mortgage, pre-Code security device); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 (recognizing common law
cause of action in case otherwise governed by U.C.C.).
198. See Basiliko, 532 A.2d at 1349 (stating that erroneous foreclosure of loan was within
exclusive knowledge and control of lender); Bogestad, 173 N.W. at 674 (stating that lender
caused foreclosure and sale to plaintiff when mortgage may have been paid).
199. See Basiliko, 532 A.2d at 1349 (stating that selling mortgagee does not give any warranty
of title, but is liable for mistake relating to underlying authority to conduct sale); Bogestad, 173
N.W. at 675 (finding no warranty of title on foreclosure sale, but implying warranty or
representation by mortgagee of subsisting mortgage upon property sold).
200. Bogestad has not been cited by a federal or state court in the 75 years since it was
decided. Basiliko has only been cited for its holding on the proper measure of damages for
breach of contract for the sale of real property. See Pagan v. Murray, 628 A.2d 110, 111 n.1
(D.C. 1993) (holding that vendor breached sales contract by declaring it void at end of 45 day
settlement period).
201. See, eg., Hutson v. Wood, 105 N.E. 343,348 (Ill. 1914) (stating that buyer atjudicial sale
bids at own risk and thus is not entitled to return of money where judgment under which sale
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far as to place the burden on the purchaser to determine whether the
lender has the power to sell.
202
The language of section 2-312(2), as explained by comment 5,
together with the general reluctance of most courts to extend the
warranty of title to foreclosure actions, would probably preclude the
purchaser from recovering under a warranty of title theory in the
proposed hypothetical. Yet, comment 5 to section 2-312 leaves open
the possibility that a purchaser who has had a unique good reclaimed
by the rightful owner may have a claim for restitution against the
seller, even though no warranty attached to the sale.2°3 Thus, we
must determine whether the purchaser has a right of restitution
under the common law against the secured creditor.
B. The Right of Restitution
A party who has given value to another, yet has received nothing in
exchange, may seek return of the value paid.2 4 Restitution may be
available as an equitable remedy where the aggrieved party has no
available remedy at law and the recipient of the value would otherwise
was made is void); England v. Clark, 5 IIl. 486, 490-92 (1843) (holding that caveat emptor
applies to execution sales, and that purchaser is not entitled to return from judgment creditor
of price paid where property sold did not belong to debtor); Dixon v. City Nat'l Bank, 395
N.E.2d 620, 624 (I1. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that purchaser at void execution sale is not
entitled to recover purchase price from creditor), aftd, 410 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1980); Diversified,
Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 722-23 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that purchaser at
foreclosure sale is not entitled to damages where sale is conducted by lender and title conveyed
thereunder was void). The Texas Court of Appeals stated in Diversfie d that "there is no
precedent in the law that would support any theory of warranty on the part of the noteholder."
Id. at 723. The Illinois Supreme Court expressed a similar view in Hutson:
The rule of caveat emptor applies to sales upon execution and judicial sales, and we
know of no case where a purchaser at such a sale, in the absence of a statute, has been
enabled to recover the money paid, either for a defective title or where for want of
power to make the sale he has acquired no title.
Hutson, 105 N.E. at 348; see also Niland v. Deason, 825 F.2d 801, 811 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that because deed of trust given to creditor creates only lien, title never vests in creditor, and
therefore, foreclosure sale transfers title directly from debtor to purchaser with no warranty of
title being made by creditor); Michie v. National Bank, 558 S.W.2d 270, 275-77 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (holding that there is no warranty of title in foreclosure sale of real estate where, although
defect was in debtor's title, purchaser alleged that seller knew of limited interest and still
purported to sell unlimited interest); Sandel v. Burney, 714 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(indicating that because foreclosure sale transfers legal title from owner of mortgaged property
to purchaser, title never vests in creditor and therefore creditor makes no warranty of title).
202. Diversfied, 702 S.W.2d at 723-24.
203. See U.C.C. § 2-312(2) cmt. 5 ("This subsection does not touch upon and leaves open
all questions of restitution arising in such cases, when a unique article so sold is reclaimed by
a third party as the rightfil owner.").
204. See RESrATEMENT OF REsTIrUnON, supra note 143, § 15 cmt. g (stating that payor is
entitled to recover money paid to payee when, because of lack of consideration or mistake of
fact, payor does not get expected exchange).
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205be unjustly enriched by its retention.
Specifically, a right of restitution exists in favor of a buyer who fails
to receive, due to a mistake of fact, the bargained-for interest in
property.2°6 This right may be limited by trade usage applicable to
a transaction in which the parties generally understand that the buyer
assumes the risk of failure20 7 or invalid title.20 1 In sales in which
the buyer has assumed the risk of invalid title, the seller is not
unjustly enriched by retention of the sale proceeds, the amount of
which presumably reflects the value of the uncertain title that the
buyer obtained. 209  Such may be the case in a foreclosure sale.
210
The Restatement of Restitution recognizes the same limitation on the
warranty of title as the comments to section 2-312 of the Code.
2 11
205. See Hutson, 105 N.E. at 348-50 (holding that purchaser at void foreclosure sale is entitled
to be repaid taxes and special assessments before owner regains possession of property);
Oesterle, supra note 139, at 175-76 (observing that unjust enrichment of one who has received
benefit is common thread that "unite[s] all restitutionary doctrines").
206. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24(1). The Restatement provides
that:
Unless it is otherwise agreed, a right to restitution exists in favor of a person who,
erroneously believing because of a mistake of fact that another has a right, title or
power, other than an interest in land, and induced by such mistake has paid money
to the other in exchange for the transfer of or promise to transfer the right or title or
for the exercise of or the promise to exercise the power, if because of the non-
existence of such right, title, or power, the payor fails to receive what it was agreed he
should receive.
Id.; see also Gremillion v. Roy, 51 So. 576, 577 (La. 1910) (finding vendor who was unable to
convey good title liable for restitution of purchase price even though parties did not agree to
warranty); Washington Sec. Co. v. State, 114 P.2d 965, 967 (Wash. 1941) (holding State liable
for return of price paid where it mistakenly sold land owned by private individual); RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24(1) cmt. a (stating that section concerns rules
governing sales agreements where buyer does not get what he expected because of defect in
interest of seller or power of one conducting transfer).
207. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24 cmt. b (explaining that what
purchaser gets in event of invalid sale is dependent upon custom where risk can fall on either
buyer or seller); see also Woods v. Somerset County Tax Claim Bureau, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d 62, 66-
70 (Sommerset County 1984) (finding that while normal inference in judicial sales is that
purchaser takes risk that no title may pass, statutory exception exists in tax sale where
transaction is void due to double assessment).
208. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24 cmt. d (explaining that in sales
on execution, purchaser assumes risk that subject matter is not owned by debtor, and, therefore,
purchaser is not entitled to recover in event of invalid title); see also Gremilion, 51 So. at 577
(finding that one who purchases interest of minor in land, without court approval, has no
reason to believe sale is valid, and thus is not entitled to return of price paid).
209. See In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 1 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979)
(finding that lack of warranty of title typically is reflected in reduced price of good at sale);
Woods, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d at 66 (stating that buyer takes risk of defective title and is not entitled
to restitution because buyer received what he bargained for and seller is not, therefore, unjustly
enriched by retention of purchase price in judicial sale).
210. See Stuart v. American Sec. Bank, 494 A.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C. 1985) (holding that bid
of purchaser at foreclosure sale makes allowance for potential outstanding encumbrances).
211. Comment d to § 24 of the Restatement of Restitution provides that:
Normally, the seller of a chattel warrants his title, and the purchaser has the alternative
of maintaining an action for breach of contract or of getting the return of his
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Specifically, the risk of defective title in a sale on execution, without
court approval, is deemed to be on the purchaser. 2 Even if no
title is transferred by the sale, the seller is entitled to retain the
monies paid and the purchaser has no restitutionary claim, unless the
parties otherwise agree.213  The purchaser may, however, be subro-
gated on the debt and lien against the debtor whose debt was satisfied
by the sale. 4
A sale on execution of a debt, without court approval, is the
common law predecessor to a foreclosure sale under article 9.21
Thus, it seems that the common law and equity also fail to provide
the innocent purchaser, who gave value in good faith, with a remedy
against the seller, who is the culpable party. Presumably, the rationale
for this approach is that the price paid at a foreclosure sale, which is
usually significantly less than fair market value, reflects the risks
consideration. On the other hand, the transaction may be conducted on the basis that
even though no tide passes by the transaction the purchaser is to take the risk. This
is the normal inference in sales on execution by a sheriff or other officer, not
requiring confirmation by a court. In these sales, unless it is otherwise agreed, the
purchaser assumes the risk that the subject matter is not owned by the execution
debtor and hence if there is a failure of tide, he is not entitled to recover the purchase
price from the officer, or from the creditor or other beneficiary in the absence of
fraud or misrepresentation.
RFSTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24 cmi d. Comment 5 to § 312 of the U.C.C.,
on the other hand, provides that:
Subsection (2) recognizes that sales by sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors and
persons similarly situated are so out of the ordinary commercial course that their
peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer and therefore no personal
obligation is imposed upon the seller who is purporting to sell only an unknown or
limited right.
U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 5.
212. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24 cmt. d; see also Note, Execution Sales
- Rights of Bona Fide Purchasers, 24 MINN. L. REv. 805, 825-26 (1940) (arguing that purchaser
is not only liable if tide fails but is also liable to sheriff for any amount left unpaid on his bid).
213. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24 cmt. d; see also Hutson v. Wood,
105 N.E. 343, 348 (Ill. 1914) (ruling that, absent statute, purchaser is unable to recover money
paid in event of either defective title or no tide acquired due to defective sale).
214. Hutson, 105 N.E. at 348-49 (holding that court, in equity, can find that purchaser of
property at void execution sale is subrogated to debt that was discharged by sale); In reArnold's
Estate, 78 Pa. D. & C. 76, 78 (Orphans CL Phila. County 1951) (stating, in dicta, that one who
has paid debt of another with expectation of standing in creditor's shoes, is subrogated on
debt); see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 43 (stating that person who
unintentionally through mistake of fact pays debt and discharges lien on property of another
is entitled to restitution in amount of value of benefit conferred); see also id. § 24 cmt d
(explaining that purchaser may have right of restitution against execution debtor whose debt
was paid off by way of subrogation); Note, supra note 212, at 826-27 (explaining that general rule
of caveat emptor applies to execution sales). But see Bassett v. Lockard, 60 IM. 164, 166 (1871)
(finding that purchaser atjudicial sale pays for whatever tile is conveyed, not for subrogation
of debt, and that sale discharges debt and creditor has no further rights in debt or collateral).
215. State Bank v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 764 (N.D. 1981) (stating that U.C:C. § 9-504
authorizes secured party to dispose of collateral upon default without court judgment).
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assumed by the buyer, including the risk of defective title. 16
In the hypothetical, while the purchaser at the foreclosure sale can
be held to have assumed the risk that a superior interest recognized
in section 9-504(4) exists, 1 7 it is doubtful that the purchaser "know-
ingly" assumed the risk of the secured seller's conversion. Regardless
of the purchaser's expectations or knowledge, the fact remains that
the seller, who injured two innocent parties, is currently free from
liability to the purchaser under the Code, common law, and equity,
and the two innocent parties are left to battle over the good.
V. THE INADEQUACY OF THE PURCHASER'S COMMON LAW REMEDY
Unless a court, in equity, fashions a new remedy for the purchaser
as against the seller, the purchaser's sole remedy is the restitutionary
216. See Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation,
22 MINN. L. REv. 939, 978 (1938) (arguing that vendee assumes risk of defective title with price
being adjusted to reflect risk unless vendor represents otherwise); see also Moister v. National
Bank, 1 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979) (finding that, in sale, lack of warranty of tite is
typically reflected in reduced price of good); Stuart v. American Sec. Bank, 494 A.2d 1333,1338
(D.C. 1985) (presuming that bid of purchaser at foreclosure sale makes allowance for potential
outstanding encumbrances); Woods v. Somerset County Tax Claim Bureau, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d
62, 66 (Somerset County 1984) (positing that in judicial sale, as in quitclaim deed, buyer takes
risk of defective title and is not entitled to restitution because buyer received what he bargained
for and, therefore, seller is not unjustly enriched by retaining of purchase price); RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 24 cmt. d (explaining that normal inference in execution
sales is that purchaser assumes risk, including that of defective title). The price realized at a
foreclosure sale is typically well below market value and often below liquidation value. SeeCraig
H. Averch & MichaelJ. Collins, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Preferential Transfers: Another Serious
Threat to Secured Creditors, 24 TEX. TECH L. REv. 985, 989-90 (1993) (indicating that foreclosure
sales, which are typically conducted swiftly and without sufficient opportunity for competitive
bidding, and which contain little motivation on part of creditor to maximize price, often do not
even generate amount equal to liquidation value of property); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing
the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA.
L. REV. 959, 959-60 (1993) (observing that prices realized at foreclosure sales often are
completely inadequate, thereby leaving debtor without property and still owing debt). A sale
can be commercially reasonable while realizing a price far below market value. See U.C.C. § 9-
507(2) ("The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or
in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner."); William H.
Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclosures: Some
Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257, 278 (1985) (arguing that there are numerous
examples of courts sustaining sales as commercially reasonable even though they bring in
collateral for far less than fair market value); see also, e.g., Sierra Fin. Corp. v. Brooks-Farrer Co.,
93 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1971) (finding that sale was commercially reasonable even when
goods worth over $27,600 sold for $500); School Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 685 S.W.2d 200,
203-04 (Ky. CL App. 1984) (finding commercially reasonable $20,564 sale of collateral with value
in excess of $163,000).
217. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (explaining that purchaser can be subject
to claims of those with superior interest, or of debtor or junior creditors, when there is defect
in sale, or purchaser did not act in good faith); see also Nickles, supra note 170, at 254
(explaining that purchasers at forced sales have usually been required to assume risk that
superior interest in property will survive sale).
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right of subrogation on the debt against the debtor.21 This right
is limited to the amount by which the debtor benefitted.21 9  From
the foreclosure sale, the debtor would receive a benefit to the extent
of the debt reduction.22 ° Under the Code, the costs of repossession
and sale are paid from the monies received at the sale before the debt
is reduced.22' Therefore, the debtor's benefit would be equal to the
purchase price less (1) costs of repossession and sale, and (2)
damages sustained due to lost use of the collateral.222 If the entire
debt is discharged due to the wrongful repossession and resale,
223
even though the price was insufficient to pay the debt in full, the
debtor arguably received a benefit equal to the amount of the entire
debt, and the purchaser should be subrogated to that amount. The
maximum amount of subrogation is generally limited, however, to the
value paid by the subrogee.224  Therefore, in restitution, the pur-
chaser will not receive more than the purchase price paid, and is
likely to receive substantially less.
If our hypothetical purchaser is limited to the return of his
purchase price, he will lose the benefit of his bargain 21 with the
218. See Dixon v. City Nat'l Bank, 395 N.E.2d 620, 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that
purchasers could not recover purchase price from creditor, but, where proceeds of void sale go
to satisfying debt owed to creditors, purchaser becomes subrogated to rights of creditor against
debtor); see also supra notes 141-64 and accompanying text (discussing debtor's remedies against
purchaser).
219. SeeREsrATEMENT OF RESrITUTION, supra note 143, § 43 & cmts. a, d (stating that person
who unintentionally discharges duty, or releases debt of another by paying third party, is entitled
to restitution of benefit conferred up to amount given); Dow & Ellis, supra note 159, at 786-87
(discussing defense where debtor is not required to give up benefit received if such restitution
will result in actual loss due to change in position).
220. See REsrATEmENT OF RETsTUTION, supra note 143, § 155 & cmt. c (explaining that
debtor is under no obligation to pay more than amount of debt to person who has discharged
it).
221. U.C.C. § 9-504(1).
222. See supra notes 144-60 and accompanying text (discussing debtor's remedies against
purchaser).
223. See supra note 14 (discussing debtor's causes of action against creditor in event of
wrongful repossession and resale).
224. RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION, supra note 143, § 43; see also Gremillion v. Roy, 51 So.
576, 577 (La. 1910) (holding that seller of property with void title is generally liable for
restitution of purchase price); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 143, § 162 (explaining
that one whose property is used to discharge debt of another is entitled to be subrogated to
position of lien-holder).
225. Under the U.C.C., a party is generally entitled to receive the benefit of his bargain. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 1-106 (indicating that aggrieved party will generally be put in as good position as
if other party had performed); Metalcraft v. Pratt, 500 A.2d 329, 336 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)
(emphasizing that party suffering from breach of contract is entitled to damages that would
place him in as good position as if contract had not been breached). This is also generally the
measure of damages for common law breach of contract actions in the United States. See, e.g.,
Basiliko v. Pargo Corp., 532 A.2d 1346, 1348 (D.C. 1987) (holding that, in breach of contract
action for sale of real estate, aggrieved party is entitled to standard contract damages, thus
providing plaintiff with benefit of bargain); Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160,164 (N.J. 1982)
(applying "American rule," providing for damages based on benefit of bargain, to breach of
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bank, as he bargained for a unique automobile. He will lose the
automobile and its value, receiving, at most, the return of his money
over time.226  Under current law, the purchaser is not entitled to
further damages from either the selling creditor or the debtor.27
The limited damages available to the purchaser in restitution are
less than what would be recoverable under a Code cause of action.
The sale is clearly within the scope of article 2 and therefore, a Code
breach of contract would warrant the imposition of Code damag-
es.228 In the event of a breach of contract, the Code seeks to place
an aggrieved party in as good as position as it would have been had
no breach occurred . 29 The Code indicates that it and its remedies
are to be liberally construed to effect this purpose.3 0  In assessing
damages under the Code, the focus is on the loss suffered by the
aggrieved party, not the benefit received by the other party.
2 31
Under the Code, where a seller fails to deliver conforming
goods23 2 due to a breach of warranty, including the warranty of
title,233 the aggrieved buyer is entitled to more than simply the
return of the purchase price paid.2 ' The buyer is entitled to be
compensated for losses caused by the breach, including incidental and
consequential damages.235  Generally, the measure of damages for
a breach of the warranty of title is the difference between the value
of the goods as warranted and as accepted, at the time and place of
contract action).
226. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing what purchasers are entitled
to recover from debtors); see also supra notes 167-217 and accompanying text (discussing
purchasers' rights and remedies against creditors under U.C.C., common law, and equity).
227. See supra notes 167-217 and accompanying text (indicating that remedies discussed are
only ones available under law).
228. See U.C.C. §§ 2-102 (providing that article 2 of Code applies to "transactions in goods"),
9-504(1) (providing that sales aspect of article 9 foreclosure sale is subject to article 2).
229. Id. § 1-106.
230. Id. §§ 1-102 & cmt. 1, -106 cmt. 1.
231. Id. § 1-106 & cmt. 1 (setting forth purpose of Code damages as compensation of
aggrieved party).
232. A seller's failure to deliver conforming goods is a breach of contract entitling the buyer
to damages. See id. § 2-301 (stating that "obligation of seller is to transfer and deliver.., in
accordance with the contract"); id. § 2-711 (listing buyer's remedies for breach by seller).
233. See Ricklefs v. Clemens, 531 P.2d 94, 100 (Kan. 1975) (holding that measure of damages
for breach of warranty is loss directly resulting from breach of warranty); Metalcraft v. Pratt, 500
A.2d 329, 336 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (noting that courts generally agree that damages for
breach of warranty under U.C.C. § 2-714 apply to breaches of warranty of title). See generally
Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Measure of Damages in Actionfor Breach of Warranty of Title to Personal
Property Under UCC § 2-714, 94 A.L.R-3d 583, 583-93 (1979) (discussing cases where courts have
determined measure of damages for breach of warranty of title by applying U.C.C. § 2-714,
which deals with breach of warranty).
234. See U.C.C. §§ 2-714 to -715 (listing buyer's damages for breach in regard to accepted
goods, as well as incidental and consequential damages).
235. Id. § 2-714(2), (3).
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acceptance.3 6
If special circumstances exist, however, for example when a unique
good is involved,237 damages in a different amount may be proven
and recovered.38 An appropriate measure of damages is then the
value of the good on the date of dispossession. 239 This measure is
appropriate regardless of whether the good has appreciated or
depreciated since acceptance.240 When damages are assessed as of
the date of dispossession, the purchaser receives the value of the good
lost, at the time it is lost, due to the breach of the warranty of title.
The purchaser is placed in as good a position as he would have been
had the seller conveyed good title as required.24'
In the event of a breach, the buyer also is entitled to recover
incidental and consequential damages.242 Incidental damages are
generally expenses incurred in the course of the transaction due to
actions a party must take in response to the other party's breach.243
Expenses recoverable as incidental damages include those "reasonably
236. Id. § 2-714(2).
237. SeeJeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80, 85 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding that New York courts
have looked to special circumstances exception under U.C.C. when deciding damages for breach
of warranty involving "unique goods"), rev'd on other grounds, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982);
Metalcraft, 500 A.2d at 336 (noting that involvement of unique good or chattel is factor in
determining existence of special circumstances).
238. U.C.C. § 2-714(2); see also Metalcraft, 500 A.2d at 336 (holding that when special
circumstances exist, different damages may be either greater or lesser than value of goods at
acceptance); Security Nat'l Bank v. Hufford, 754 P.2d 561,566 n.6 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (noting
that measure of damages for breach of warranty of title is equal to loss directly and naturally
resulting from breach); Roy R. Anderson, Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods,
57 Miss. LJ. 317, 365-68 (1987) (discussing appropriate measure of damages in action for
breach of warranty of title).
239. See Metalkraft, 500 A.2d at 336; Itoh v. Kimi Sales, 345 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419-20 (Civ. Ct.
1973) (finding that value of damages should be value of property when it was taken away). But
seejerry Parks Equip. Co. v. Southeast Equip. Co., 817 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
that measure of damages is value of goods at acceptance and, absent other evidence, is equal
to purchase price).
240. Ricklefs v. Clemens, 531 P.2d 94, 100 (Ran. 1975) (finding dispossession date
appropriate where good had depreciated since purchase); Metalcraft, 500 A.2d at 336 (holding
that measure of damages is value of goods at date of dispossession regardless of whether value
was more or less than it was on date of acceptance); Schneidt v. Absey Motors, 248 N.W.2d 792,
798 (N.D. 1976) (stating that damages are determined at date of dispossession where good had
appreciated in value since purchase).
241. SeeMetalcraft, 500 A.2d at 336 (noting that general principle of contract law is that party
receives benefit of his bargain by being put in as good position as he would have had contract
not been breached); see also National Micrographics Sys. Inc. v. OCE-Indus., 465 A.2d 862, 869
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (stating that law tries to encourage reliable contracting by giving
nonbreaching party benefit ofbargain);Jeny Parks 817 F.2d at 343 (stating that purpose of Code
damages is to put complaining party in position that is as good as party would have been if
contract had been performed).
242. U.C.C. § 2-714(3). See generally Roy R. Anderson, Incidental and Consequential Damages,
7J.L. & CoM. 327 (1987) (discussing incidental and consequential damages).
243. Petroleo Brasiliero, S.A., Petrobas v. Ameropan Oil Co., 372 F. Supp. 503,508 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (stating that in absence of specified damages in contract, plaintiff may include incidental
damages resulting from defendant's breach).
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incurred in the inspection, receipt, transportation care and custody"
of rejected goods, or in connection with effecting cover.
2 44
Consequential damages generally do not arise within the buyer-
seller relationship, resulting instead from the particular needs of the
buyer that the seller could reasonably foresee.245  Consequential
damages may include damages for loss of use of the good, interest
and finance charges, repair costs, transfer charges, and sales and use
tax. 46  Specifically, in an action for breach of the warranty of title,
recoverable consequential damages may include the costs incurred by
the buyer in defending its right to the good, such as reasonable
attorney's fees.247 Clearly, if the buyer is required to pay damages
to the good's rightful owner due to the seller's breach of the warranty
244. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) provides that:
Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully
rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection
with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other
breach.
U.C.C. § 2-715(1); see also id. (giving buyer right to "cover" after seller's breach by making
reasonable purchase of goods to substitute for those due from seller).
245. PetroLeo Brasiliero, 372 F. Supp. at 508 (stating that consequential damages "do not arise
within the scope of the immediate buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred
by the non-breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a proximate
result of the breach"). U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (a) provides:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (a).
246. Anderson, supra note 242, at 360-64 (listing examples of recurring categories of
consequential damages); see also Seekings v.Jimmy GMC, 638 P.2d 210, 215 (Ariz. 1981) (stating
that consequential damages are those damages that can reasonably be supposed to be with
contemplation of parties at time of contracting); Riggs Motor Co. v. Archer, 240 S.W.2d 75, 76
(Ky. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that buyer was entitled to damages including amount expended
for automobile repairs and accessories). But seeTheobald v. Sprouse, 257 So. 2d 516, 518 (Miss.
1972) (holding that repair costs incurred are not recoverable in action for breach of warranty
of title).
247. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 385, 391
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that in warranty of title action, buyer may collect as consequential
damages his expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in defending title to good after buyer
has given seller notice of third-party claim); see also Perkins State Bank v. Connolly, 632 F.2d
1306, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that attorney's fees are recoverable in indemnity action
based on payment and defense of third-party breach of warranty action under article 4 of
U.C.C.); Chemco Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 F. Supp. 278,
286 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (holding du Pont liable for attorney's fees expended on third-party claim);
Alterman Foods v. G.C.C. Beverages, 310 S.E.2d 755, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
attorney's fees incurred by buyer in defense of third-party breach of warranty action are
recoverable as consequential damages); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, 265 N.W.2d 513, 527 (Wis.
1978) (holding that attorney's fees and expenses incurred in third-party litigation are
recoverable as consequential damages, but attorney's fees incurred in litigation between buyer
and seller are not). See generally David T. Schaefer, Note, Attorneys'Fees for Consumers in Warranty
Actions - An Expanding Role for the U. C. C. ?, 61 IND. L.J. 495 (1986) (discussing recoverability of
attorneys' fees in breach of warranty litigation).
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of title, the buyer is entitled to indemnification from the seller for the
amounts paid.248
Under either approach to the measure of general damages for
breach of the warranty of title, the purchaser is entitled to recover the
fair market value of the good, as determined at the time of either
acceptance or dispossession because the value of the goods as
accepted is zero. 249  Either version of the fair market value should
exceed the purchase price as the vast majority of foreclosure sales
occur at substantially less than fair market value.2 ' Additionally, the
buyer would be entitled to recover incidental and consequential
damages it has incurred as a result of the seller's failure to convey
good title."5
If our hypothetical purchaser were able to recover damages under
the Code for the seller's failure to convey good title, the purchaser
would receive the fair market value12 of the Tucker plus incidental
and consequential damages, including costs incurred in defending his
title against the debtor."s Yet, as the law currently stands, at most
the purchaser would recover only the purchase price, paid over time.
This amount is likely to be substantially less than the fair market value
of the good. The purchaser can only be made whole by permitting
a Code cause of action against the seller, consistent with the general
policies of the Code and article 2 in particular.254
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 9-504(4)
The cases and commentary discussed above establish that both the
248. See Anderson, supra note 242, at 427 (arguing that buyer was entitled to "indemnifica-
tion" from manufacturer for damages that were incidental). U.C.C. § 2-607(5) (a) binds a seller,
who, after notice, has refused to defend a warranty action brought by a third party against the
buyer, to the determination of facts made in that litigation. See Perkins State Bank, 632 F.2d at
1315 (awarding attorney's fees for third-party suits under article 4 warranties); Chemco Indus., 366
F. Supp. at 283-84 (discussing third-party suit under implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 493 S.W.2d at 392 (discussing indemnification in warranty
of title action); see also Catlin Aviation Co. v. Equilease Corp., 626 P.2d 857, 859 (Okla. 1981)
(holding that it is obligation of seller who warrants title to clear title).
249. The fair market value of goods transferred with void title is zero. SeeJerry Parks Equip.
Co. v. Southeast Equip. Co., 817 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing calculation of
damages). The value of the goods as warranted, that is, with good title, is the fair market value.
The difference between the two is, therefore, equal to the fair market value. Id.
250. See supra note 216 (citing examples of foreclosure sales at reduced prices).
251. U.C.C. § 2-715 & cmt.
252. Id. § 2-713(1) & cmt. The good as accepted, with void title, would have a market value
of zero. As warranted, the purchaser would have received good title, and thus, the value would
be market value. The damages the purchaser has actually sustained are thus equal to the
automobile's fair market value. Id.
253. See id. § 2-715 (listing examples of recoverable incidental and consequential damages).
254. Id. §§ 1-106 & cmt. 1, 2-703 cmt. 4, 2-711 cmt. 3 (stating that remedies provided by
U.C.C. should be liberally administered).
1994] 209
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSHIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:167
Uniform Commercial Code and the common law inadequately
address the respective rights of the debtor and purchaser where the
collateral is sold in the absence of a default. As the law currently
stands, in lieu of pursuing a claim against the secured creditor,
255
an astute debtor may proceed against the purchaser, seeking either
to reclaim the collateral or recover damages for conversion .256 This
gap in the Code shifts the loss to one of the innocent parties in the
transaction, while permitting the wrongdoer, the secured creditor,
potentially to retain the benefit it received from the purchaser.5
Purchasers at foreclosure sales are entitled to greater certainty as to
the rights they obtain through the sale. 258  Debtors should be given
guidance on their right to reclaim property that has been wrongfully
foreclosed and sold. The resolution of the paradox created by the
Code should balance the equities between the parties to the transac-
tion. A paradigm for resolving this conflict is needed.
A. Method for Allocating Risks Between Debtor and Purchaser
Two of the primary goals of article 9 are to promote efficiency and
certainty in secured financing transactions. 9 These goals are
255. See id. § 9-507(1) (providing debtor with remedy against secured creditor for violations
of part 5 of article 9).
256. In some instances, the secured creditor will purchase the good at the foreclosure sale,
and then resell it as the "owner" to another. Averch & Collins, supra note 216, at 989
(discussing how secured creditor converts lien through foreclosure sale). Much of the foregoing
analysis will apply to this type of transaction as well. Clearly, where the secured creditor is the
purchaser, it will take subject to all of the debtor's rights because the debtor was not in default.
See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (providing protection generally for good faith third-party purchaser of
collateral from secured party where debtor is in default); supra notes 19-23 and accompanying
text (stating that secured party who sells property of nondefaulting debtor has converted
property). The later sale to a third party will be subject to article 2 as a sale of a good. U.C.C.
§§ 2-102, -106. The general rule on title would therefore still apply. See id. § 2-403 (stating that
purchaser acquires all title that his transferor had). The only difference would be that the
warranty of title would attach to the sale, in the absence of special circumstances or a disclaimer
by the seller. Id. § 2-312. In this type of transaction, the purchaser would still lose the property
to the debtor who is the rightful owner. See supra notes 19-139 and accompanying text (setting
out rights of purchaser at forced sale, and observing that current version of article 9 does not
protect purchase where debtor is not in default). If the warranty of title attaches to the sale,
however, the purchaser will have a Code remedy for the seller's failure to convey good title.
U.C.C. § 2-312(1).
257. The secured creditor will retain the benefits from the sale only if the debtor does not
pursue the creditor under U.C.C. § 9-507(1) or the common law. Yet as to the purchaser, the
secured creditor is free from liability. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text (discussing
apportionment of liability at foreclosure sale).
258. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. ("The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified
structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can
go forward with less cost and with greater certainty.").
259. Id.; see also Gilmore, supra note 57, at 36 (stating that purpose of article 9 "is to make
the taking of security easy, cheap and certain"); REPORT OF PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 2 (December 1, 1992) [hereinafter PEB REPORT] (stating that uncertainty
adds to transactional costs and can result in reduced availability of credit). For this analysis, I
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partially accomplished by the Code's existing provisions for resolving
purchaser-debtor disputes that arise through a foreclosure sale after
default."' They could also be furthered by a Code framework for
resolving conflicts that arise from a foreclosure sale in the absence of
default. If incorporated into the Code, a solution to the problem
would reduce the need to resort to costly litigation, increase certainty,
and decrease transactional costs associated with foreclosure sales. 61
By closing the current gap in the rights acquired by purchasers, article
9 will move closer to "the comprehensive scheme for the regulation
of security interests in personal property" that the drafters sought to
achieve.
Historically, the resolution of disputes between owners and
purchasers of collateral has focused on the concept of "title."
263  If
the purchaser did not receive title to the disputed property from his
transferor, then the owner, who held good title, could reclaim the
property regardless of the purchaser's good faith or lack of knowl-
edge.2 4 On the other hand, if the purchaser acquired good title,
then the owner was divested of it by operation of lawY.2 5  Because
only one party could hold good title, the determination of the title
issue resolved the dispute.
This approach was further embodied in the common law doctrines
of nemo dat266 and qui prior est tempore potior est jure.267  Generally,
accept that the goals of article 9 are worthwhile. For critiques of these goals, see Alan Schwartz,
The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1984) (questioning whether
certainty creates efficiency for economy as whole) and Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency
Justification for Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff 42 KAN. L. REV. 13
(1993) (stating that article 9 is weak justification for interference and foreclosure of choices).
Even if the goals are assailable, both the courts and the committees currently working on the
revision of article 9 continue to be guided by them. See, e.g., Farns Assocs. v. South Side Bank,
417 N.E.2d 818, 822-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (applying article 9 in order to promote underlying
purposes and policies); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 N.W.2d 612, 614-
15 (Minn. 1976) (discussing purposes of article 9); Matteson v. Harper, 682 P.2d 766, 769 (Or.
1984) (discussing purposes of article 9). See generally PEB REPORT, supra (relying on espoused
purposes of article 9 as basis for recommendations of change).
260. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing risky default at foreclosure
sale).
261. See PEB REPORT, supra note 259, at 2 (stating that increasing certainty decreases
transactional costs); Maumer, supra note 7, at 101 (arguing that rules should be drafted to
increase certainty, and thereby decrease need to resolve disputesjudicially and in turn, decrease
costs of dispute resolution). Increasing certainty and thereby decreasing the costs incident to
a commercial transaction was one of the primary purposes guiding the drafters of article 9. See
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt; see also id. § 1-102 & cmts.
262. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.
263. See Mautner, supra note 8, at 97-99 (discussing doctrinal-derivational approach to
triangle conflicts).
264. See Mautner, supra note 8, at 129-30 (discussing entrustment of goods).
265. Mautner, supra note 8, at 129-30.
266. The rule of"Nemo dat quod non habet," meaning "he who has not cannot give," dates
from Roman times. Boris Kozolchyk, Transfer of Personal Property by a Nonowner: Its Future in Light
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the first claim to the property was superior. The original holder of
title, who had not been lawfully divested of it, prevailed over
subsequent parties claiming title to the good because the original
owner was "first in time."2" The purchaser prevailed only when the
seller had some right or title that was transferable as against the
owner of the property.
This historical approach is reflected in the current method by
which the Code and courts resolve disputes between purchasers and
"owners" of property. Section 2-403 conditions the rights of a
purchaser on the transferor's title.269 If a purchaser does not
acquire good title, the original owner is entitled to reclaim the
property, again despite the purchaser's good faith or lack of knowl-
edge °.27  This is currently true even if the owner was in a position
to prevent the loss of the good.27'
This preoccupation with title is antithetical to the general approach
of the U.C.C. Article 9 specifically rejects title as the criterion that
determines the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a secured
transaction. 272 The drafters similarly rejected tide as a determinative
factor in article 2.27'3 The drafters declared that their rejection of
title as definitive reflected a need to "avoid making practical issues
of its Past, 61 TUL L. REv. 1453, 1462-63 (1987) (discussing "newness" of grantees rights).
267. "He who is first in time is first in right." Mautner, supra note 8, at 135 (discussing
priority rules of common law for resolving conflicts); see also Peper v. American Exch. Nat'l
Bank, 205 S.W.2d 215, 220-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947) (holding that, in equity, where one of two
innocent persons must suffer because of wrongdoing of third party, one whose interest arose
first prevails).
268. See Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 Ill. 411, 424 (1863) (holding that true owner may follow his
property and reclaim it wherever found); RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 14, § 9.3, at 193 (discussing
general rule that one who has no title to goods cannot pass title to even bona fide purchaser);
Mautner, supra note 8, at 135 (discussing common law for resolving conflicting transactions in
land).
269. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (c) provides that "a purchaser acquires all title which his transferor
had or had power to transfer." U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (c).
270. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing remedies for owner of
converted goods).
271. See Mautner, supra note 8, at 98 (discussing doctrinal-derivational approach).
272. U.C.C. § 9-202, entitled "Title to Collateral Immaterial," states, "Each provision of this
Article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the
secured party or in the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-202. In his treatise, Professor Hawkland explains
that U.C.C. § 9-311 "reinforces the notion that questions of who has 'legal title' to the collateral
are irrelevant insofar as the rights, obligations and remedies of the secured party, the debtor and
interested third parties are concerned." HAWKLAND, supra note 4, § 9-311:01, at 186.
273. See U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (stating that contract is to be basis for legal action); National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and American Law Institute, Uniform
Commercial Code: Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, Developments Since September,
1949, at 8 (Sept. 1950). In responding to Professor Williston's attack on the proposed U.C.C.'s
minimization of the importance of title, the Committee stated, "[A]dmitting that this minimizing
of title is a 'break with tradition,' your Committee feels that Article 2 sets forth a body of rules
with respect to sales in a form more usable by practicing attorneys and businessmen" than
previous commercial laws. Id.
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between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible
something, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence."274
Yet that is precisely what the current focus on title accomplishes. The
comparative equities between the parties are not considered. The
relative abilities of the parties to prevent or mitigate the damages
caused by the secured creditor's wrongful actions are immaterial. The
sole issue considered is whether title remained with the original
owner or instead passed to the purchaser. Once that issue is settled,
the respective rights of the parties mechanistically fall in line.
Some commentators have suggested that the time has come for the
Code and the courts to move away from their fixation on title for the
resolution of disputes between parties who did not transact with each
other, both of whom are not responsible for the losses sustained. 75
By shifting the focus from title and its appurtenant rights and
obligations, the Code can be revised to resolve the claim to the
collateral in an equitable fashion, and place the ultimate responsibility
on the culpable party, the secured seller.276
Considerations of economic efficiency, relative culpability, loss
avoidance, and loss minimalization permit the resolution of the
debtor-purchaser dispute in a manner that is more equitable and
consistent with the aims of the Code.2 77 Economic efficiency should
encourage the maximization of the price paid at foreclosure sales.
2 78
The more certain the title received in a sale, and the less likely that
the debtor can successfully challenge the purchaser's title, the more
274. U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt.
275. See, e.g., Mautner, supra note 8, at 99 (arguing that solutions based on justice or
efficiency are preferable to Code); Tabac, supra note 86, at 410 (stating that transactions should
be based on ownership principles).
276. The secured creditor is the party "at fault" in a legal and moral sense, having acted in
contravention of both the law and its agreement with the debtor. As demonstrated in the text,
while the secured creditor currently is liable to the debtor for her damages, it is not liable to
the purchaser. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text (discussing unjust apportionment
of liability under Code); see also U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (providing debtor with cause of action against
secured party who violates article 9).
277. See Mautner, supra note 8, at 99 (proposing alternatives to doctrinal-derivational
approach for resolving triangle conflicts that do not focus on intermediate party); see also
Starnes, supra note 4, at 577 (proposing economic efficiency as factor to consider in resolving
article 9 disputes).
278. See Gilmore, supra note 57, at 43 (arguing that default provision of article 9 should
promote disposition of collateral at highest possible price); Starnes, supra note 4, at 577 (stating
that specific goal of article 9 is maximization of efficiency and certainty). Price maximization
is one of the policies underlying U.C.C. § 9-504. See supra note 57 (observing that debtor is
entitled to any surplus over his liabilities). Professor Gilmore noted that the drafters' goal in
structuring the rules for disposition of collateral by a secured creditor was to "lay down rules
which would promote the highest possible yield on disposition of the collateral." Grant Gilmore,
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code - Part V, 7 PERS. FIN. L.Q 4, 7 (1952).
1994] 213
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
valuable the collateral and the greater the purchase price will be 279
thereby achieving economic efficiency.2"° The current hodgepodge
of law, which favors the debtor over the purchaser for no better
reason than the debtor was "first in time," and which requires the
parties to resort to the judicial process for a declaration of rights, is
economically inefficient.
281
The equitable concerns of relative culpability and loss avoidance are
interrelated. Relative culpability considers whether either party is
"blameworthy" vis-a-vis the other party because its actions or failure to
act either permitted or facilitated the creditor's wrongful conduct.28
2
Loss avoidance weighs each party's ability to avoid the loss by
preventing the secured party's unauthorized repossession and
sale.
283
Between the debtor and purchaser, while each may be legally and
morally "innocent," having acted in accordance with the Code and
common law, one party may be more blameworthy for the loss if she
acted or failed to act when she had the opportunity to prevent the
loss. Likewise, where one party is aware of the defect and has the
ability to prevent the consummation of the sale, the law should
require that party to do so, or risk losing the right to the good.
24
The debtor is more likely to be in a position to influence the
creditor's actions because she is the one with a contractual and
ongoing relationship with the secured party. Often, a debtor will be
in a position to prevent the loss where she knows that the secured
creditor is operating under misinformation, but fails to correct the
creditor's error. Similarly, where a creditor wrongfully declares a
default, if the debtor is capable of providing the creditor with
279. See Moister v. National Bank, 1 B.R. 324, 328 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979) (stating that, in
sales consummated without attachment of warranty of title, uncertainty of title is reflected in
purchase price); Woods v. Somerset County Tax Claim Bureau, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d 62, 66 (Ct.
Com. Pls. 1984) (holding that in judicial sale, buyer takes risk of defective title and pays price
accordingly).
280. In this context, economic efficiency means maximizing satisfaction, or gain, while
minimizing the costs associated with achieving it. See Barnes, supra note 259, at 14-15, 26-27
(defining efficiency as measure ofsatisfaction taking into account relative costs); Richard Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theoy, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (defining wealth and its
relationship to wealth maximization as amount people are willing to pay to get something or be
paid to give it up).
281. See In reSamuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir.) (stating that goal of article 9 is
continuity of perfected security interests despite subsequent loss of control of collateral by
debtor), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
282. Mautner, supra note 8, at 128.
283. See Mautner, supra note 8, at 99-102, 128 (discussing priority rules to promote
efficiency).
284. Mautner, supra note 8, at 104 (stating that in dispute between two innocent parties,
where one can avoid loss, equity requires that other party receive priority).
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information necessary to vitiate the declaration of default, she should
be encouraged to do so. While the debtor, having no duty to act,
may not be legally "blameworthy" if she fails to act, her failure would
contribute to the loss of the good and therefore should be considered
in resolving a dispute over the collateral.
Additionally, repossession and resale do not happen instantaneous-
ly.285 The debtor is given the right, under the Code, to enjoin a
secured creditor's attempt to wrongfully repossess or resell." 6 Given
this power, the debtor is more likely to be in a position to prevent the
loss than the purchaser, a stranger to the financing arrangement.287
The debtor, therefore, should be required to avail herself of the
Code's protections or lose her rights in the collateral as against the
purchaser.
In some situations, neither the debtor nor the purchaser will be
able to mitigate or avoid the loss. Under those circumstances, the
culpability and avoidance concerns are insufficient to achieve a
solution. With all else being equal, distributive justice seeks to
minimize the loss incurred in the transaction. To accomplish loss
minimalization, the party who would suffer the greatest harm by
losing the good should prevail. 9 The loss sustained due to the
deprivation of the use and value of the good would generally be the
same for the debtor or purchaser in the hypothetical propounded.
The debtor, however, who is apt to have purchased the good in the
marketplace, is more likely to have paid at or near fair market value
for the good than the purchaser who bought at a foreclosure sale.29°
If neither party was in a position to prevent the loss, the debtor, who
probably invested more in the acquisition of the collateral, should
prevail to minimize the loss sustained in the transaction as a whole.
To reach the most equitable result, these considerations would have
to be weighed in each case. This case by case approach, however,
would defeat the economic efficiency gained by the predictability of
285. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (requiring secured party, under most circumstances, to give debtor
reasonable notice before sale is consummated).
286. Id. § 9-507(1) ('If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions.").
287. For the purchaser to be in a position to avoid the loss, he would presumably need to
know that the disposition is unauthorized and unlawful. In such a situation, the purchaser
would not be acting in good faith and would not be entitled to protection under § 9-504(4).
See id. § 9-504(4) (setting out rights of purchasers who act in good faith).
288. Mautner, supra note 8, at 103-05 (discussing concept ofjustice as method of allocating
risk of wrongdoer's action).
289. Mautner, supra note 8, at 103-05 (discussing distributive justice).
290. See supra note 216 (discussing risk factors that go into calculation of fair price).
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outcome and the reduced transactional costs that result therefrom.
Therefore, a Code solution that accounts for these factors as they
would arise in most circumstances, as discussed above, is warranted.
Such a balancing results in a different answer to the issues in debtor-
purchaser conflict than the current "title" approach.
B. Statutory Solution
With the foregoing policies and purposes in mind, section 9-504
should be redrafted as follows:
(4) (a) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after
default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the
debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest under which
it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto.
The purchaser takes free of all such rights and interest even though
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this Part
or any judicial proceedings
(1) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowl-
edge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in
collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the person
conducting the sale; or
(2) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(b) An otherwise qualified purchaser under subsection (a) who
purchases at a sale under this section acquires such rights notwith-
standing a subsequent determination that the secured party's
declaration of default was unjustified or otherwise invalid if the
debtor has failed to preserve his rights in the collateral under
section 9-507(1) in a timely and reasonable manner.
(c) A purchaser who voluntarily or otherwise relinquishes the
collateral, pays or is liable for damages, or defends an action by a
debtor who was not in default at the time of the sale, may recover
from the secured party any loss sustained, including the purchase
price paid, and incidental and consequential damages.
The proposed section (4) (a) and its subsections (1) and (2) are the
current sections (4) and its subsections (a) and (b). Proposed section
(b) attempts to balance the equities between the debtor and the
purchaser. If the debtor has failed to avail herself of her rights to
restrain the sale or otherwise protect her interest in the collateral
before the sale, equity requires that the debtor bear the loss of the
collateral resulting from the secured party's wrongful actions. On the
other hand, if the debtor has had insufficient time to prevent the sale,
or otherwise has acted reasonably to protect her rights, the debtor
should not lose the right to the collateral.
In the event that the debtor prevails over the purchaser, the
purchaser is expressly given the right to recoup his full losses from
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the selling secured creditor under proposed section (c). This section
is designed to countermand the language of Official Comment 5 to
section 2-312, which currently bars recovery from the selling secured
party under an action for breach of the warranty of title.291
In either event, the purchaser and the debtor are protected, and
the wrongdoer, the selling secured party, remains ultimately liable for
the damages caused by its actions. If the debtor has delayed or acted
unreasonably to prevent the sale, the purchaser obtains title to the
good and the debtor retains her action for damages against the
creditor under section 9-507(1). If the debtor is unable to protect
herself in a reasonable and timely manner, the debtor may reclaim
the collateral from the purchaser. The purchaser may then recover
damages from the selling secured party. This proposed amendment
closes a gap, however unintended, created by the current language of
the Code and its Official Comments.
291. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 5.
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